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We consider the verification of lock-free data structures that manually manage their memory with the help
of a safe memory reclamation (SMR) algorithm. Our first contribution is a type system that checks whether
a program properly manages its memory. If the type check succeeds, it is safe to ignore the SMR algorithm
and consider the program under garbage collection. Intuitively, our types track the protection of pointers as
guaranteed by the SMR algorithm. There are two design decisions. The type system does not track any shape
information, which makes it extremely lightweight. Instead, we rely on invariant annotations that postulate a
protection by the SMR. To this end, we introduce angels, ghost variables with an angelic semantics. Moreover,
the SMR algorithm is not hard-coded but a parameter of the type system definition. To achieve this, we rely on
a recent specification language for SMR algorithms. Our second contribution is to automate the type inference
and the invariant check. For the type inference, we show a quadratic-time algorithm. For the invariant check,
we give a source-to-source translation that links our programs to off-the-shelf verification tools. It compiles
away the angelic semantics. This allows us to infer appropriate annotations automatically in a guess-and-check
manner. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our type-based verification approach, we check linearizability for
various list and set implementations from the literature with both hazard pointers and epoch-based memory
reclamation. For many of the examples, this is the first time they are verified automatically. For the ones where
there is a competitor, we obtain a speed-up of up to two orders of magnitude.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the last decade we have experienced an upsurge in massive parallelization being available even
in commodity hardware. To keep up with this trend, popular programming languages include in
their standard libraries features to make parallelization available to everyone. At the heart of this
effort are concurrent (thread-safe) data structures. Consequently, efficient implementations are in
high demand. In practice, lock-free data structures are particularly efficient.
Unfortunately, lock-free data structures are also particularly hard to get correct. The reason is the
absence of traditional synchronization using locks andmutexes in favor of low-level synchronization
using hardware instructions. This calls for formal verification of such implementations. In this
context, the de-facto standard correctness property is linearizability [Herlihy and Wing 1990]. It
requires, intuitively, that each operation of a data structure implementation appears to execute
atomically somewhen between its invocation and return. For users of lock-free data structures,
linearizability is appealing. It provides the illusion of atomicity—they can use the data structure as
if they were using it in a sequential setting.
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Proving lock-free data structures linearizable has received a lot of attention (cf. Section 10).
Doherty et al. [2004], for instance, give a mechanized proof of a practical lock-free queue. Such
proofs require plenty ofmanual work and take a considerable amount of time.Moreover, they require
an understanding of the proof method and the data structure under consideration. To overcome
this drawback, we are interested in automated verification. The cave tool by Vafeiadis [2010a,b],
for example, is able to establish linearizability for singly-linked data structures fully automatically.
The problem with automated verification for lock-free data structures is its limited applicability.
Most techniques are restricted to implementations that assume a garbage collector (GC). This
assumption, however, does not apply to all programming languages. Take C/C++ as an example. It
does not provide an automatic garbage collector that is running in the background. Instead, it is
the programmer’s obligation to avoid memory leaks by reclaiming memory that is no longer in use
(using delete). In lock-free data structures, this task is much harder than it may seem at first glance.
The root of the problem is that threads typically traverse the data structure without synchronization.
Hence, there may be threads holding pointers to records that have already been removed from the
structure. If records are reclaimed immediately after the removal, those threads are in danger of
accessing deleted memory. Such accesses are considered unsafe (undefined behavior in C/C++ [ISO
2011]) and are a common cause for system crashes due to a segfault. The solution to this problem
are so-called safe memory reclamation (SMR) algorithms. Their task is to provide lock-free means
for deferring the reclamation/deletion until all unsynchronized threads have finished their accesses.
Typically, this is done by replacing explicit deletions with calls to a function retire provided
by the SMR algorithm which defers the deletion. Coming up with efficient and practical SMR
implementations is difficult and an active field of research (cf. Section 10).
The use of SMR algorithms to manage manually the memory of lock-free data structures hinders
verification, both manual and automated. This is due to the high complexity of such algorithms.
As hinted before, an SMR implementation needs to be lock-free in order not to spoil the lock-free
guarantee of the data structure using it. In fact, SMR algorithms are quite similar to lock-free data
structures implementation-wise. This added complexity could not be handled by automatic verifiers
up until recently. Meyer and Wolff [2019] were the first to present a practical approach. Their key
insight is that the data structure can be verified as if it was relying on a garbage collector rather than
an SMR algorithm, provided the data structure does not perform unsafe memory operations. Since
data structures from the literature are usually memory safe, the above insight is a powerful tool for
verification. Nevertheless, it leaves us with a hard task: establishing that all memory operations
are safe in the presence of memory reclamation. Meyer and Wolff [2019] were not able to conduct
this check under GC. Instead, they explore the entire state space of the data structure with SMR,
restricting reallocations to a single address, to prove ABAs harmless (a criterion they require for
soundness). Unfortunately, their state space exploration does not scale well.
In the present paper we tackle the challenge of proving a lock-free data structure memory safe.
We present a type system to address this task. That is, we present a syntax-centric approach to
establish the semantic property of memory safety. In particular, we no longer need expensive state
space explorations that can handle SMR and memory reuse in order to prove memory safety. This
allows us to utilize the full potential of the above result: if our type check succeeds, we remove the
SMR code from the data structure and verify the resulting implementation using an off-the-shelf
GC verifier. The idea behind our type system is a life cycle common to lock-free data structures
with manual memory management via SMR [Brown 2015]. The life cycle, depicted in Figure 1, has
four stages: (i) local, (ii) active, (iii) retired, and (iv) not allocated. Newly allocated records are in the
local stage. The record is known only to the allocating thread; it has exclusive read/write access.
The goal of the local stage is to prepare records for being published, i.e., added to the shared state
of the data structure. When a record is published, it enters the active stage. In this stage, accesses to
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the record are safe because it is guaranteed to be allocated. However, no thread has exclusive access
and thus must fear interference by others. It is worth pointing out that a publication is irreversible.
Once a record becomes active it cannot become local again. A thread, even if it removes the active
record from the shared structures, must account for other threads that have already acquired a
pointer to that record. To avoid memory leaks, removed records eventually become retired. In this
stage, threads may still be able to access the record safely. Whether or not they can do so depends
on the SMR algorithm used. Finally, the SMR algorithm detects that the retired record is no longer
in use and reclaims it. Then, the memory can be reused and the life cycle begins anew.
Not Allocated
Active
LocalRetired
Fig. 1. Memory life cycle of records in
lock-free data structures using SMR.
The main challenge our type system has to address
wrt. the above memory life cycle is the transition from
the active to the retired stage. Due to the lack of syn-
chronization, this can happen without a thread noticing.
Programmers are aware of the problem. They protect
records while they are active such that the SMR guaran-
tees safe access even though the record is retired. To cope
with this, our types integrate knowledge about the SMR
algorithm. A core aspect of our development is that the
actual SMR algorithm is an input to our type system—it
is not tailored towards a specific SMR algorithm.
An additional challenge arises from the type system
performing a thread-local analysis, it considers the pro-
gram code as if it was sequential. This means the type
system is not aware of the actual interference among
threads, unlike state space explorations. To address this, we use types that are stable under the
actions of interfering threads [Owicki and Gries 1976].
In practice, protecting a record while it is active is non-trivial. Between acquiring a pointer to the
record and the subsequent SMR protection call, an interferer may retire the record, in which case the
protection has no effect. SMR algorithms usually offer no means to check whether a protection was
successful. Instead, programmers exploit intricate data structure invariants to perform this check. A
common such invariant, for instance, is all shared reachable records are active. A type system typically
cannot detect such data structure shape invariants. We turn this weakness into a strength. We
deliberately do not track shape invariants nor alias information. Instead, we use simple annotations
to mark pointers that point to active records. To relieve the programmer from arguing about their
correctness, we show how to discharge annotations automatically. Interestingly, this can be done
with off-the-shelf GC verifiers. It is worth pointing out that the ability to automatically discharge
invariants allows for an automated guess-and-check approach for placing invariant annotations.
To increase the applicability of our type system, we use the theory of movers [Lipton 1975] as
an enabling technique. Movers are a standard approach to transform a program into a more atomic
version while retaining its behavior. That the resulting program is more atomic is beneficial for
verification. The transformations are practical: Elmas et al. [2009], for example, automate them.
To demonstrate the usefulness of our approach, we implemented a linearizability checker which
realizes the techniques presented in this paper. That is, our tool (i) performs a type inference to
establish memory safety relying on invariant annotations, (ii) discharges the annotations under
GC using cave as a back-end, and (iii) verifies linearizability under GC using cave. Additionally,
we implemented a prototype for automatically inserting annotations and applying movers. These
program transformations are performed on demand, guided by a failed type inference. Our tool is
able to establish linearizability for lock-free data structures from the literature, like Michael&Scott’s
lock-free queue [Michael and Scott 1996], the Vechev&Yahav CAS set [Vechev and Yahav 2008], the
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Vechev&Yahav DCAS set [Vechev and Yahav 2008], and the ORVYY set [O’Hearn et al. 2010], for
the well-known hazard pointer method [Michael 2002b] as well as epoch-base reclamation [Fraser
2004]. We stress that our approach is not limited to cave as a back-end but can use any verifier for
garbage collection. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to automatically verify lock-free
set implementations that use SMR.
We summarize our contributions and the outline of the paper:
§5 presents our type system for proving lock-free data structures memory safe wrt. a user-
specified SMR algorithm,
§7 presents an efficient type inference algorithm,
§8 presents an instrumentation of the data structure under scrutiny to discharge invariant
annotations fully automatically with the help of a GC verifier, and
§9 evaluates our approach on well-known lock-free data structures from the literature.
We illustrate our contribution in §2, introduce the programming model in §3, discuss preliminary
results in §4, give a comprehensive example in §6, and discuss related work in §10.
2 THE CONTRIBUTION ON AN EXAMPLE
We illustrate our approach on Micheal&Scott’s lock-free queue [Michael and Scott 1996], Figure 2,
which is used, for example, as Java’s ConcurrentLinkedQueue and as C++ Boost’s lockfree::queue.
The queue is organized as a NULL-terminated singly-linked list of nodes. The enqueue operation
appends new nodes to the end of the list. To do so, an enqueuer first moves Tail to the last node as
it may lack behind. Then, the new node is appended by pointing Tail->next to it. Last, the enqueuer
tries to move Tail to the end of the list. This can fail as another thread may already have moved
Tail to avoid waiting for the enqueuer. The dequeue operation removes the first node from the list.
Since the first node is a dummy node, dequeue reads out the data value of the second node in the list
and then moves the Head to that node. Additionally, dequeue maintains the property that Head does
not overtake Tail. This is done by moving Tail towards the end of the list if necessary. (There is
an optimized version due to Doherty et al. [2004] which avoids this step.) Note that updates to the
shared list of nodes are performed exclusively with single-word atomic compare-and-swap (CAS).
So far, the discussed implementation assumes a garbage collector. The nodes allocated by enqueue
are not reclaimed explicitly after being removed from the shared list by dequeue: the queue leaks
memory. Unfortunately, there is no simple solution to this problem. Uncommenting the explicit
deletion from Line 51 avoids the leak. However, it leads to use-after-free bugs. Due to the lack
of synchronization, threads may still hold and dereference pointers to the now deleted node. A
dereference of such a dangling pointer, however, is unsafe. In C/C++, for example, dereferencing a
dangling pointer has undefined behavior [ISO 2011] and may make the system crash with a segfault.
To solve the problem, programmers employ safe memory reclamation (SMR) algorithms. Two
well-known examples are epoch-based reclamation (EBR) [Fraser 2004] and hazard pointers (HP)
Michael [2002b]. They offer a function retire that replaces the ordinary delete. The difference
is that retire does not immediately delete nodes. Instead, it defers the deletion until it is safe. In
order to discover whether a deletion is safe, threads need to declare which nodes they access. How
this is done depends on the SMR algorithm.
Epoch-based reclamation offers two additional functions leaveQ and enterQ. Threads use the
former to announce that they are going to access the data structure and use the latter to announce
that they have finished the access. The function names, in particular the Q, refer to the fact that
the threads are quiescent [McKenney and Slingwine 1998] between enterQ and leaveQ, meaning
they do not modify the data structure. During the non-quiescent period, EBR guarantees that the
shared reachable nodes are not reclaimed, even if they are removed from the data structure and
retired. To use EBR, the programmer simply replaces delete statements with calls to retire and
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1 struct Node { data_t data; Node* next; };
2 shared Node* Head , Tail;
3
4 atomic init() {
5 Head = Tail = new Node ();
6 Head ->next = NULL;
7 }
8
9 void enqueue(data_t input) {
10 E leaveQ ();
11 Node* node = new Node ();
12 node ->data = input;
13 node ->next = NULL;
14 while (true) {
15 Node* tail = Tail;
16 H protect(tail , 0);
17 H if (tail != Tail) continue;
18 Node* next = tail ->next;
19 if (tail != Tail) continue;
20 if (next != NULL) {
21 CAS(&Tail , tail , next);
22 continue;
23 }
24 if (CAS(&tail ->next , next , node)) {
25 CAS(&Tail , tail , node);
26 break;
27 }
28 }
29 E enterQ ();
30 }
31 data_t dequeue () {
32 E leaveQ ();
33 while (true) {
34 Node* head = Head;
35 H protect(head , 0);
36 H if (head != Head) continue;
37 Node* tail = Tail;
38 Node* next = head ->next;
39 H protect(next , 1);
40 if (head != Head) continue;
41 if (next == NULL) {
42 E enterQ ();
43 return EMPTY;
44 }
45 if (head == tail) {
46 CAS(&Tail , tail , next);
47 continue;
48 } else {
49 data_t output = next ->data;
50 if (CAS(&Head , head , next)) {
51 // delete head;
52 H E retire(head);
53 E enterQ ();
54 return output;
55 }
56 }
57 }
58 }
Fig. 2. Michael&Scott’s lock-free queue [Michael and Scott 1996] with two different safe memory reclama-
tion techniques: epoch-based reclamation (EBR) [Fraser 2004] and hazard pointers (HP) [Michael 2002b].
The modifications needed to use EBR are marked with E and the modifications needed to use HP are
marked with H. For HP, we assume two hazard pointers per thread.
adds calls to leaveQ (enterQ) at the beginning (end) of data structure operations. Consider Figure 2
for an example; the lines marked by E are the modifications required to use EBR. While easy to
use, EBR implementations usually stop reclaiming memory altogether upon thread failure. Hazard
pointers do not suffer from this problem.
The hazard pointer method requires threads to declare which nodes they access in a per-node
fashion. To that end, HP offers an additional function: protect. It signals that a deletion of the
received node should be deferred. To be precise, HP guarantees that the deletion of a node is
deferred if it has been continuously protected since before it was retired [Gotsman et al. 2013].
While this method is conceptually simple, it is non-trivial to apply.
To use hazard pointers with Michael&Scott’s queue requires to add the code marked by H in
Figure 2. As for EBR, delete statements are replaced with retire. Moreover, pointers that are
accessed need protection to defer their deletion. Simply calling protect is usually insufficient as
the protect may be too late. A common pattern for protecting pointers is to first protect them
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and then check that they have not been retired since. In Michael&Scott’s queue this is done by
testing whether the protected nodes are still shared reachable—the queue maintains the invariant
that nodes reachable from the shared pointers are never retired. To make this precise, consider
Lines 34 to 36. Line 34 reads in head from the shared pointer Head. The dequeue operation will
access (dereference) head. Hence, it has to make sure that the referenced node remains allocated.
To do so, a protection of head is issued in Line 35. However, the node pointed to by head may have
been dequeue and retired since head was read. To ensure that the protection is successful, that is,
not too late, Line 36 restarts the dequeue operation in case head no longer coincides with Head. The
remaining protections in the code follow the same principle.
Our contribution is a method for verifying lock-free data structures which use an SMR algorithm,
like Michael&Scott’s queue with EBR/HP from Figure 2. At the heart of our method lies a type
system which proves safe all pointer operations in the data structure. In the case of hazard pointers,
for instance, this requires to prove all pointer accesses appropriately protected. Once this property
is established, we show that the actual verification does not need to consider the SMR algorithm: it
suffices to verify the data structure under garbage collection; the SMR function invocations can be
removed altogether. This allows the use of off-the-shelf GC verifiers.
2.1 A Type System to Simplify Verification
Our main contribution is a type system a successful type check of which proves a given program
free from unsafe memory operations. The type assigned to a pointer specifies if it is safe to access
that pointer. The types are influenced by both the memory life cycle from Section 1 and the SMR
algorithm used. In the case of hazard pointers, a pointer may be protected and thus guaranteed not
to be deleted. Hence, the protected pointer can be accessed without precautions. For an unprotected
pointer, on the other hand, threads may need to take additional steps to guarantee that the pointer
is not dangling, for instance, by establishing that it (to be precise, its address) is in the active stage.
{ shared:A }
(34) Node* head = Head;
{ shared:A, head: }
(35) protect(head , 0);
{ shared:A, head:Eisu }
(36) assume(head == Head);
{ shared:A, head:Eisu ∧ A }
{ shared:A, head:S }
(38) Node* next = head ->next;
{ shared:A, head:S, next: }
(39) protect(next , 1);
{ shared:A, head:S, next:Eisu }
(40) assume(head == Head);
{ shared:A, head:S, next:S }
Fig. 3. Idealized typing for the non-retrying
branch of Lines 34 to 40.
We illustrate our type system on the dequeue oper-
ation of Michael&Scott’s queue. The interesting part
is the typing of the local pointers head and next in
Lines 34 to 40. The type derivation is depicted in Fig-
ure 3. Let us assume for the moment that the shared
pointers and the nodes reachable through them are
in the active stage. We denote this by shared :A. It is
the only type binding at the beginning of the opera-
tion. The first assignment, Line 34, adds a type binding
for head to the type environment. The type for head
is copied from the source pointer, Head. However, we
remove A immediately after the assignment so that
the actual type of head is . The reason for this are
interfering threads: as discussed above, an interferer
can dequeue and retire the node pointed to by head. As
a consequence, we cannot guarantee that head is active;
we indeed need to remove A. Next, Line 35 protects
head. We set the type of head to Eisu, encoding that a
protection has been issued. Remembering that head is protected is crucial for the subsequent condi-
tional. Line 36 tests whether Head has changed since it was read into head. If it has not, denoted
by assume(head == Head) in Figure 3, we join the type of head with the type of Head. That is, head
receives A. Now, we know that the protection has been issued before the node pointed to by
head has been retired. So the hazard pointer method guarantees that the node is not deleted. The
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subsequent code can access head without precautions. We incorporate this fact into the type of head
by updating it to S, indicating that accesses are safe. (We skip the assignment to tail from Line 37,
it does not affect the type check.) Next, Line 38 dereferences head. This dereference is safe since
head has type S, it is guaranteed to be allocated. The type assigned to next is  because we do not
assign types to pointers within nodes, like head->next. Hence, next cannot obtain any guarantees
from the assignment. Line 39 then protects next. Similarly to the above, we set its type to Eisu. The
following conditional, Line 40, tests again if Head has changed since the beginning of the operation.
Consider the case it has not. If we remember that next is the successor of head, we know that next
references a shared reachable node. Hence, we can assign type A to next. As in the case for head,
this allows us to lift the type to S. That is, using next in the following code becomes safe due to the
conditional guaranteeing its activeness. The remainder of the type check is then straightforward
since only protected and/or shared pointers are used.
We stress that the actual SMR algorithm is a parameter to our type system—it is not limited to
analyzing programs using hazard pointers.
2.2 Data Structure Invariants in the Type System
The type check as illustrated in Section 2.1 is idealized. We assumed that we maintain type A for
shared pointers and the nodes reachable through them. Moreover, we assumed that next remains
the successor of head during an execution of dequeue. Such invariants of the data structure are
notoriously hard to derive. Typically, it requires a state-space exploration of all thread interleavings
to find invariants of lock-free data structures. A major challenge in exploring the state space is
the need for an effective (symbolic) way of tracking the data structure shape [Abdulla et al. 2013;
Brookes 2004; O’Hearn 2004; O’Hearn et al. 2001; Reynolds 2002].
We tackle the above problem as follows: we do not track the data structure shape at all, not even
pointer aliases. Instead, we require the programmer to annotate which pointers/nodes are active.
This allows the type check to rely on data structure invariants which typically cannot be found by
a type system. To free the programmer from manually proving the correctness of such annotations,
we automate the correctness check. We give an instrumentation of the program under scrutiny
such that an ordinary GC verifier can discharge the invariants. A thing to note is that the simple
nature of active annotations and the ability to automatically discharge them makes it possible to
find appropriate annotations fully automatically (guided by a failed type check).
Revisiting the previous example, the type environments never contain shared :A. To arrive at
type S for head in Line 36 nevertheless, we annotate the assume(head == Head) statement with an
invariant stating that head is active. Then, the type derivation for Line 36 remains the same as
before. We argue that, provided the queue implementation is memory safe, there must be a code
location between the protection in Line 35 and the subsequent dereference in Line 38 where an
active annotation can be placed. To see this, assume there is no such code location. This means head
is not active in Lines 35 to 38. That is, it must have been retired before the protection in Line 35,
rendering the protect unsuccessful. Hence, the dereference in Line 38 is unsafe, contradicting our
assumption of memory safety. For pointer next, we proceed similarly and add an active annotation
to the second assumption (Line 40).
With the above annotations our type system can rely on aspects of the dynamic behavior without
requiring the programmer to manually take over parts of the verification. We believe that having
annotations makes the type system more versatile (compared to having none) in the sense that data
structures need not satisfy implicit invariants like all shared pointers and nodes are active. Moreover,
relying on annotations rather than shape invariants allows for a much simpler type system.
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2.3 Supporting Different SMR Algorithms
The above illustration focuses on hazard pointers. The actual type system we develop in Section 5
does not—it is not tailored towards a specific SMR algorithm. To achieve this degree of freedom,
our type system takes as a parameter a formal description of the SMR algorithm being used. We
rely on a recent specification language for SMR algorithms [Meyer and Wolff 2019]: SMR automata.
Then, our types capture the locations of the SMR automaton that can be reached after having seen
a sequence of SMR calls in the program (control-flow sensitive type system). This allows the types
to track the relevant sequences of SMR calls. Moreover, it allows them to detect when the deletion
of a node is guaranteed to be deferred in order to infer type S.
3 PROGRAMMING MODEL
We introduce concurrent shared-memory programs that employ a library for safe memory recla-
mation (SMR) and are annotated by invariants. A programming construct that is new to our model
are angels, ghost variables with an angelic semantics. Angels are second-order pointers holding
sets of addresses. When typing (cf. Section 5), angels will help us track the protected nodes.
3.1 Programs
We define a core language for concurrent shared-memory programs. Invocations to a library for
safe memory reclamation and invariant annotations will be added below. Programs P are comprised
of statements defined by
stmt ::= stmt; stmt | stmt ⊕ stmt | stmt∗ | com
com ::= p := q | p := q.next | p.next := q | u := q.data | p.data := u | u := op(u¯)
| p := malloc | assume cond | beginAtomic | endAtomic
cond ::= p = q | p , q | pred(u¯) .
We assume a strict typing that distinguishes between data variables u, u′ ∈ DVar and pointer vari-
ables p, q ∈ PVar . Notation u¯ is short for u1, . . . , un . The language includes sequential composition,
non-deterministic choice, and Kleene iteration. The primitive commands include assignments, mem-
ory accesses, memory allocations, assumptions, and atomic blocks. They have the usual meaning.
We make the semantics of commands precise in a moment.
Memory. Programs operate over addresses fromAdr that are assigned to pointer expressions PExp.
A pointer expression is either a pointer variable from PVar or a pointer selector a.next ∈ PSel. The
set of shared pointer variables accessible by every thread is shared ⊆ PVar . Additionally, we allow
pointer expressions to hold the special value seg < Adr denoting undefined/uninitialized pointers.
There is also an underlying data domain Dom to which data expressions DExp = DVar ⊎ DSel with
a.data ∈ DSel evaluate. A generalization of our development to further selectors is straightforward.
The memory is a partial function m : PExp⊎DExp ↛ Adr⊎{seg}⊎Dom that respects the typing.
The initial memory is mϵ . Pointer variables p are uninitialized, mϵ (p) = seg. Data variables u have
a default value, mϵ (u) = 0. We modify the memory with updates up of the form e 7→ v. Applied to
a memory m, the result is the memory m′ = m[e 7→ v] defined by m′(e) = v and m′(e′) = m(e′) for
all e′ , e. Below, we define computations τ which give rise to sequences of updates. We write mτ
for the memory resulting from the initial memory mε when applying the sequence of updates in τ .
Liberal Semantics. We define a semantics where program P is executed by a possibly unbounded
number of threads. In this semantics some addresses may be freed non-deterministically by the
runtime environment. This behavior will be constrained by a memory reclamation algorithm in a
moment. Formally, the liberal semantics of program P is the set of computations ⟦P⟧YX . It is defined
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relative to two sets Y ⊆ X ⊆ Adr of addresses allowed to be reallocated and freed, respectively.
A computation is a sequence τ of actions of the form act = (t , com, up). The action indicates that
thread t executes command com that results in the memory update up. The definition of the liberal
semantics is by induction. The empty computation is always contained, ϵ ∈ ⟦P⟧YX . Then, action
act can be appended to computation τ , denoted τ .act ∈ ⟦P⟧YX , if τ ∈ ⟦P⟧YX , act respects the control
flow of P , and one of the following holds.
(Assign) If act = (t , p.next := q,a.next 7→ b) then mτ (p) = a and mτ (q) = b. There are similar
conditions for the remaining assignments.
(Assume) If act = (t , assume lhs = rhs,) then mτ (lhs) = mτ (rhs). There are similar conditions
for the remaining assumptions.
(Malloc) If act = (t , p := malloc, up), then up has the form p 7→ a,a.next 7→ seg,a.data 7→ d so
that a ∈ fresh(τ ) or a ∈ freed(τ ) ∩ Y , and d ∈ Dom.
(Free) If act = (⊥, free(a),) then a ∈ X .
(Atomic) If act = (t , beginAtomic,) or act = (t , endAtomic,).
Note that Rule (Free) may spontaneously emit free(a), although there is no free command in
the programming language. Indeed, the free command will be issued by the memory reclamation
algorithm defined in the next section (it is not part of P ). The rule allows us to define the set of allo-
catable addresses for rule (Malloc) as addresses that have never been allocated in the computation,
denoted by fresh(τ ), and addresses which have been freed since their last allocation, freed(τ ).
3.2 Safe Memory Reclamation
We consider programs that manage their memory with the help of a safe memory reclamation (SMR)
algorithm. In this setting, threads do not free their memory themselves (no explicit free command),
but request the SMR algorithm to do so. The SMR algorithm will have means of understanding
whether an address is still accessed by other threads, and only execute the free when it is safe to
do so. As a consequence, the semantics of the program depends on the SMR algorithm it invokes.
The means of detecting whether an address can be freed safely depend on the SMR algorithm. De-
spite the variety of techniques, it was recently observed that the behavior of major SMR algorithms
can be captured by a common specification language [Meyer and Wolff 2019]: SMR automata.1
Intuitively, the SMR automaton models the protection protocol of its SMR algorithm, while ab-
stracting from implementation details. We recall SMR automata and use them to restrict the liberal
semantics to the frees performed by the SMR algorithm.
SMR Automata. An SMR algorithm offers a set of functions f (r¯ ) for the programmer to provide
information about the intended access to the data structure, like leaveQ, enterQ, and retire in the
case of EBR (cf. Section 2). An SMR automaton, as depicted in Figure 4, is a finite control structure
the transitions of which are labeled with these function symbols. Additionally, each transition
comes with a guard. The guard influences the flow of control in the SMR automaton based on the
actual parameters of function calls. To distinguish the parameters, the automaton maintains a finite
set of local variables storing thread identifiers and addresses. Guards may then compare the actual
parameters with the values of variables.
What makes SMR automata a useful modeling language is their compactness: complex SMR
algorithms can be captured by fairly small SMR automata. This is achieved by an interesting
definition of the semantics. SMR automata accept bad behavior, free commands that should not be
executed after a sequence of SMR function calls protecting the address.
1Working on compositional verification, Meyer and Wolff [2019] call them observers.
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What makes SMR automata interesting for automated verification are two technical restrictions
that limit their expressiveness. First, the variable values are chosen only once, in the beginning
of the computation, and never changed. This choice is non-deterministic. The idea is that the
automaton picks some protection to track. Second, transition guards can only compare for equality.
That this is sufficient to properly model the behavior of SMR algorithms can be explained by the
fact that SMR algorithms are designed to work with very different data structures, from stacks to
queues to trees. Hence, there is no point for the SMR algorithm to store information about the data
structure more specific than the equality of pointers.
Syntactically, an SMR automaton O is a tuple consisting of a finite set of locations, a finite set
of variables, and a finite set of transitions. There is a dedicated initial location and a number of
accepting locations. Transitions are of the form l−−−−→f (r¯ ), g l′ with locations l, l′, event f (r¯ ), and guard g.
Events f (r¯ ) consist of a type f and parameters r¯ = r1, . . . , rn . The guard is a Boolean formula over
equalities of variables and parameters r¯ .
Semantically, a (runtime) state s of the SMR automaton is a tuple (l,φ) where l is a location and φ
maps variables to values. Such a state is initial if l is initial, and similarly accepting if l is accepting.
Then, (l,φ)−−−→f (v¯) (l′,φ) is an SMR step if l−−−−→f (r¯ ), g l′ is a transition and φ(g[r¯ 7→ v¯]) evaluates to true.
By φ(g[r¯ 7→ v¯]) we mean g with the variables replaced by their φ-mapped values and the formal
parameters r¯ replaced by the actual values v¯ . As mentioned before, the valuation φ is chosen
non-deterministically in the beginning; it is not changed by steps. A history h = f1(v¯1) . . . fn(v¯n) is
a sequence of events. If there are SMR steps s−−−−→f1(v¯1) · · · −−−−→fn (v¯n ) s′, we write s−→h s′. If s′ is accepting,
we say that h is accepted by s.
Acceptance in SMR automata characterizes bad behavior, and a history h is said to violate O if
there is an initial state s and an accepting state s′ such that s−→h s′. The specification of O is the set
of histories that are not accepted:
S(O) := {h | ∀s, s′. s−→h s′ ∧ s initial =⇒ s′ not accepting} .
We also use a restriction of the specification. The set FO(h, a) contains those continuations h′ of h
so that h.h′ ∈ S(O) and moreover at most address a is freed in h′. As bad behavior means executing
a forbidden free, we assume accepting states can only be reached by transitions labeled with free
and cannot be left.
To give an example, consider the SMR automaton OBase × OEBR from Figure 4. It formalizes
the informal specification of EBR from Section 2. Automaton OBase , Figure 4a, forbids an EBR
implementation to free addresses that have not yet been retired or have not been retired since their
last free. Put differently, it forbids spurious frees and double-frees. Automaton OEBR, Figure 4b,
requires the EBR implementation to defer the free of retired nodes which could still be accessed by
some thread. A thread can still access the retired node if it has acquired a pointer to the node before
it was retired (following the usage policy of EBR discussed in Section 2). This is the case if the thread
started accessing the data structure before the retire, which it announces via a call to leaveQ.
While every SMR implementation has its own SMR automaton, the practically relevant SMR
automata are products2 of OBase with further SMR automata [Meyer and Wolff 2019], like for EBR
in the above example. Our development relies on this.
We also assume that the SMR automaton has two distinguished variables zt and za . Intuitively,
variable zt will store the thread for which the SMR automaton tracks the protection of the address
stored in za . All SMR algorithms we know can be specified with only two variables. A possible
explanation is that SMR algorithms do not seem to use helping [Herlihy and Shavit 2008] to protect
2The product operation on SMR automata is defined as expected and leads to an intersection of the specifications.
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OBase
L1 L2 L3
free(a), a = za
enter retire(t, a), a = za
free(a), a = za
(a) SMR automaton specifying that address za may be freed only if it has been retired and not freed since.
The automaton uses one variable za .
OEBR
L4 L5 L6 L7
exit leaveQ(t),
t = zt
enter retire(t ,a),
a = za
free(a),
a = za
enter enterQ(t), t = zt
(b) SMR automaton characterizing when EBR defers frees, using two variables zt and za . It states that
address za must not be freed if it was retired while zt is in-between leaveQ and enterQ calls.
Fig. 4. Epoch-based reclamation (EBR) is specified by the SMR automaton OBase × OEBR . For legibility, we
omit self loops on all locations for the events that are not given.
pointers. We are not aware of an SMR algorithm where the protection of an address would be
inferred from communication with another address or, more ambitiously, another thread.
Moreover, we inherit from [Meyer and Wolff 2019] the natural requirement that SMR algorithms
do not remember addresses that have been freed in order to detect (and react to) reallocations.
Formally, an SMR automaton supports elision if for all histories h the behavior on address a after h
(i) is not affected by a free of another address b, FO(h.free(b), a) = FO(h, a), (ii) is not affected by
renaming another two addresses b and c , FO(h, a) = FO(h[b/c], a), (iii) is included in the behavior
on a after another history h′ provided a is fresh after h′, FO(h, a) ⊆ FO(h′, a), and (iv) contains
the behavior on a after h.free(a), FO(h.free(a), a) ⊆ FO(h, a). To understand (iv), note that the
task of the SMR algorithm is to protect addresses from being freed. Hence it is safe to delay frees.
For convenience, we summarize our assumptions on SMR automata. All SMR automata we
encountered, including the ones from [Meyer and Wolff 2019], satisfy them.
Assumption 1. SMR automata (i) reach accepting states only with free and do not leave them,
(ii) are products with OBase , (iii) have distinguished variables zt and za , and (iv) support elision.
It will be convenient to have a post-image postp,com(L) on the locations of SMR automata. The
post-image yields a set of locations L′ reachable by taking a com-labeled transition from L. The
considered transition is restricted in two ways. First, its guard g must allow zt to track thread t
executing com. Second, if p appears as a parameter in com, then guard g must allow za to track
p. Formally, these requirements translate to the satisfiability of g ∧ t = zt and g ∧ p = za ,
respectively. The parameterization in p makes the post-image precise. For an example, consider
OBase and the command com = enter retire(p). We expect the post-image of L2 wrt. com and p to
be postp,com(L2) = {L3}. The address has definitely been retired. Without the parametrization in p,
we would get {L2, L3}. The transition could choose not to track p.
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SMR Semantics. To incorporate SMR automata into our programming model, we generalize the
set of program commands com to include calls to and returns from SMR functions:
com ::= com | enter func(p¯, u¯) | exit func .
We add corresponding actions to the liberal semantics ⟦P⟧YX . They make visible the function
call/return but do not lead to memory updates.
(Enter) act = (t , enter func(p¯, u¯),). (Exit) act = (t , exit func,).
To use SMR automata in the context of computations, we convert a computation τ into a history h
by projecting τ to the enter, exit, and free commands and replacing the formal parameters with the
actual values. To be precise, we use as events the function names offered by the SMR algorithm plus
free. The parameters to an event are the values of the actual parameters as well as the executing
thread. In the case of exit events, we drop the actual parameters and in case of free events we
drop the executing thread. For example,H(τ .(t , enter func(p),)) = H(τ ).func(t , mτ (p)).
The SMR semantics of a program is the restriction of the liberal semantics to the specification of
the SMR automaton of interest. More precisely, given an SMR automaton O and sets Y ⊆ X ⊆ Adr
of reallocatable and freeable addresses, the SMR semantics induced by O,X ,Y of program P is
O⟦P⟧YX := {τ | τ ∈ ⟦P⟧YX ∧H(τ ) ∈ S(O)} .
SMR algorithms only restrict the execution of free commands, their functions can always be in-
voked by the program. SMR automata mimic this by including in their specification all histories that
do not respect the control flow. In particular, we have the following property. In the absence of frees,
the SMR automaton does not play a role. The resulting semantics, ⟦P⟧, is garbage collection (GC).
Lemma 3.1. O⟦P⟧ = ⟦P⟧ for every SMR automaton O.
To see the lemma, note that only accepting states in O may rule out computations from ⟦P⟧.
By Assumption 1, only events free(a) may lead to such accepting states.
Reconsider the SMR automaton OBase . For this automaton to properly restrict the frees in a
program, the program should not perform double retires, that is, not retire an address again before
it is freed. The point is that SMR algorithms typically misbehave after a double retire (perform
double frees), which is not reflected in OBase (it does not allow for double frees after a double retire).
Our type system will establish the absence of double retires for a given program.
3.3 Angels
Angels can be understood as ghost variables with an angelic semantics. Like for ghosts, their purpose
is verification: angels store information about the computation that can be used in invariants but
that cannot be used to influence the control flow. This information is a set of addresses, which
means angels are second-order pointers. The set of addresses is determined by an angelic choice, a
non-deterministic assignment that is beneficial for the future of the computation.
The idea behind angels is the following. When typing, some invariants of the runtime behavior
may not be deducible by the type system. Angels allow the programmer to make them explicit in
the program and thus available to the type check. Consider EBR’s leaveQ function. It guarantees
that all currently active addresses remain allocated, i.e., will not be reclaimed even if they are
retired. An angelic choice is convenient for selecting the set. Subsequent dereferences can then use
invariant annotations to ensure that the dereferenced pointer holds an address in the set captured
by the angel. With this, our type system is able to detect that the access is safe.
To incorporate angels and invariant annotations into our programming model, we generalize
the set of commands as follows
com ::= com | @inv angel r | @inv p = q | @inv p in r | @inv active(p) | @inv active(r) .
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inv(τ ) := invϵ (τ )
invσ (ϵ) := true
invσ (act.τ ) := ∃r .invσ .act(τ ) if act = (t , @inv angel r,)
invσ (act.τ ) := mσ (cond) ∧ invσ .act(τ ) if act = (t , @inv cond,)
invσ (act.τ ) := mσ (p) ∈ r ∧ invσ .act(τ ) if act = (t , @inv p in r,)
invσ (act.τ ) := mσ (p) ∈ active(σ ) ∧ invσ .act(τ ) if act = (t , @inv active(p),)
invσ (act.τ ) := r ⊆ active(σ ) ∧ invσ .act(τ ) if act = (t , @inv active(r),)
invσ (act.τ ) := invσ .act(τ ) otherwise.
Fig. 5. Formula capturing the correctness of invariant annotations in a computation τ .
Angels are local variables r from the set AVar . Invariant annotations include allocations of angels
with the keyword angel r . Intuitively, this will map the angel to a set of addresses. Conditionals
behave as expected. The membership assertion p in r checks that the address of p is included in
the set of addresses held by the angel r . The predicate active(p) expresses that the address pointed
to by p currently is neither freed nor retired, and similar for active(r). We use x to uniformly refer
to pointers p and angels r .
In the liberal semantics ⟦P⟧YX , the above commands do not lead to memory updates:
(Invariant) act = (t , @inv • ,).
Invariant annotations behave like assertions, they do not influence the semantics but it has
to be verified that they hold for all computations. To make precise what it means for invariant
annotations to hold for a computation τ , we construct a formula inv(τ ). The invariant annotations
are defined to hold for τ iff inv(τ ) is valid. The construction of the formula is given in Figure 5.
There, active(σ ) is the set of addresses that are neither freed nor retired after computation σ . We
only consider programs leading to closed formulas, meaning every angel is allocated (and hence
quantified) before it is used. The semantics of the formula is as expected: angels evaluate to sets
of addresses, equality of addresses is the identity, and membership is as usual for sets. Section 8
shows how to automatically prove the correctness of invariant annotations for all computations.
4 GETTING RID OF MEMORY RECLAMATION
Despite the compact formulation of SMR algorithms as SMR automata, analyzing programs in the
presence of memory reclamation remains difficult. Unlike for programs running under garbage
collection, ownership guarantees [Bornat et al. 2005; Boyland 2003] and the resulting thread-local
reasoning techniques [Brookes 2004; O’Hearn 2004; O’Hearn et al. 2001; Reynolds 2002] do not
apply. Meyer and Wolff [2019] bridge this gap. They show that it is sound and complete to conduct
the verification under garbage collection provided the program properly manages its memory.
So one can establish this requirement and then perform the actual verification under the simpler
semantics. Their statement is as follows; we give the missing definitions in a moment.
Theorem 4.1 (Conseqence of Theorem 5.20 in [Meyer and Wolff 2019]). If the semantics
O⟦P⟧Adr is pointer-race-free, then O⟦P⟧AdrAdr corresponds to ⟦P⟧.
With the above theorem, the only property to be checked in the presence of memory reclamation
is the premise of pointer race freedom. However, Meyer and Wolff [2019] report on this task as
being rather challenging, requiring an intricate state space exploration of a semantics much more
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complicated than garbage collection. The contribution of the present paper is a type system to
tackle exactly this challenge (cf. Section 5).
We elaborate on pointer races and the correspondence between the semantics.
Pointer Race Freedom. Pointer races generalize the concept of memory errors by taking into
account the SMR algorithm [Haziza et al. 2016; Meyer and Wolff 2019]. A memory error is an access
through a dangling pointer, a pointer to an address that has been freed. Such accesses are prone to
system crashes, for example, due to segfaults. Indeed, the C/C++11 standard considers programs
with memory errors to have an undefined semantics (catch-fire semantics) [ISO 2011].
To make precise which pointers in a computation are dangling, Haziza et al. [2016] introduce the
notion of validity. A pointer is then dangling if it is invalid. Initially, all pointers are invalid. A pointer
is rendered valid if it receives its value from an allocation or from a valid pointer. A pointer becomes
invalid if its address is freed or it receives its value form an invalid pointer. It is worth pointing out
that free(a) invalidates all pointers to address a but a subsequent reallocation of a validates only
the receiving pointer. We denote the set of valid pointers after a computation τ by validτ .
We already argued that dereferences of invalid pointers may lead to system crashes. Consequently,
passing invalid pointers to the SMR algorithm may also be unsafe. Consider a call to retire(p)
requesting the SMR algorithm to free the address of p. If p is invalid, then its address has already
been freed, resulting in a system crash due to a double free. Yet, we cannot forbid invalid pointers
from being passed to SMR functions altogether. For instance, protect may be invoked with invalid
pointers in Lines 16 and 35 of Michael&Scott’s queue from Section 2. To support such calls, one
deems a command enterfunc(p¯, u¯) unsafe, if replacing the actual values of invalid pointer arguments
with arbitrary values may exhibit new (and potentially undesired) SMR behavior. We inherit the
the formal definition from Meyer and Wolff [2019] as it is an integral part of their proof strategy.
Definition 4.2 (Definition 5.12 in Meyer andWolff [2019]). Consider a computation τ with history h.
A subsequent action act is an unsafe call if its command is enter func(p¯, u¯) with pi < validτ for
some i , mτ (p¯) = a¯, mτ (u¯) = d¯ , and:
∃ c ∃ b¯ . (∀i . (ai = c ∨ pi ∈ validτ ) =⇒ ai = bi ) ∧ FO(h.func(t , b¯, d¯), c) ⊈ FO(h.func(t , a¯, d¯), c) .
Definition 4.3 (Following Definition 5.13 in Meyer and Wolff [2019]). A computation τ .act is a
pointer race if act (i) dereferences an invalid pointer, (ii) is an assumption comparing an invalid
pointer for equality, (iii) retires an invalid pointer, or (iv) is an unsafe call.
Correspondence. Theorem 4.1 establishes a correspondence between the behavior of full O⟦P⟧AdrAdr
and the simpler, garbage collected semantics ⟦P⟧. It states that we find for every computation
τ ∈ O⟦P⟧AdrAdr another computation σ ∈ ⟦P⟧ such that σ mimics τ . We denote this by τ ≺ σ .
Relation ≺ requires τ and σ to agree on the control locations of all threads and the valid memory
of τ . Intuitively, this means that any pointer-race-free action after τ has the same effect after σ
because the action cannot access the invalid part of the memory without raising a pointer race. Put
differently, threads cannot distinguish whether they execute in τ or in σ . So they cannot distinguish
whether or not memory is reclaimed.
Technically, τ and σ agree on the valid memory of τ if mτ |validτ = mσ |validτ . Here, mτ |validτ
denotes the restriction of mτ to its valid part validτ . It restricts the domain of mτ to validτ and
to data variables and to data selectors of addresses referenced from validτ . It is worth pointing
out the asymmetry in the definition of τ ≺ σ : mσ is restricted to validτ . This is necessary because
there are no free commands in σ and thus pointer expressions that are invalidated in τ are never
invalidated in σ . The correspondence is precise enough for verification results of safety properties
to carry over from one semantics to the other.
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5 A TYPE SYSTEM TO PROVE POINTER RACE FREEDOM
We present a type system a successful type check of which entails pointer race freedom as required
by Theorem 4.1. The guiding idea of our types is to under-approximate the validity of pointers. To
achieve this, our types incorporate the SMR algorithm in use and the guarantees it provides. It does
so in a modular way: a parameter of the type system definition is an SMR automaton specifying
the SMR algorithm.
A key design decision of our type system is to track no information about the data structure shape.
Instead, we deduce runtime specific information from automatically dischargeable annotations. We
still achieve the necessary precision because the same SMR algorithm may be used with different
data structures. Hence, shape information should not help tracking its behavior.
5.1 Overview
Towards a definition of our type system, recall the memory life cycle from Section 1. The transition
from the active to the retired stage requires care. The type system has to detect that a thread
is guaranteed safe access to a retired node. This means finding out that an SMR protection was
successful. Additionally, types need to be stable under interference. Nodes can be retired without a
thread noticing. Hence, types need to ensure that the guarantees they provide cannot be spoiled by
actions of other threads.
To tackle those problems, we use intersection types capturing which access guarantees a thread
has for each pointer. We point out that this means we track information about nodes in memory
through pointers to them. We use the following guarantees.
L: Thread-local pointers referencing nodes in the local stage. The guarantee comes with two
more properties. There are no valid aliases of the pointer and the referenced node is not retired.
This gives the thread holding the pointer exclusive access.
A Pointers to nodes in the active stage. Active pointers are guaranteed to be valid, they can be
accessed safely.
S Pointers to nodes which are protected by the SMR algorithm from being reclaimed. Such
pointers can be accessed safely although the referenced node might be in the retired stage.
EL SMR-specific guarantee that depends on a set of locations in the given SMR automaton. The
idea is to track the history of SMR calls performed so far. This history is guaranteed to reach
a location in L. The information about L bridges the (SMR-specific) gap between A and S.
Accesses to the pointer are potentially unsafe.
The interplay among these guarantees tackles the aforementioned challenges as follows. Consider
a thread that just acquired a pointer p to a shared node. In the case of hazard pointers, this pointer
comes without access guarantees. Hence, the thread issues a protection of p. We denote this with
an SMR-specific type E. For the protection to be successful, the programmer has to make sure that
p is active during the invocation. The type system detects this through an annotation that adds
guaranteeA to p. We then deduce from the SMR automaton that p can be accessed safely because the
protection was successful. This adds guarantee S. (We have seen this on an example in Section 2.)
5.2 Types
Throughout the remainder of the section we fix an SMR automaton O relative to which we describe
the type system. The SMR automaton induces a set of intersection types [Coppo and Dezani-
Ciancaglini 1978; Pierce 2002] defined by the following grammar:
T ::=  | L | A | S | EL | T ∧T .
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The meaning of the guarantees L to EL is as explained above. We also write a type T as the set of
its guarantees where convenient. We define the predicate isValid(T ) to hold if T ∩ {S,L,A} , .
The three guarantees serve as syntactic under-approximations of the semantic notion of validity
from the definition of pointer races (cf. Section 4).
There is a restriction on the sets of locations L for which we provide guarantees EL . To understand
it, note that our type system infers guarantees about the protection of pointers thread-locally from
the code, that is, as if the code was sequential. Soundness then shows that these guarantees carry
over to the computations of the overall program where threads interfere. To justify this sequential
to concurrent lifting, we rely on the concept of interference freedom due to Owicki and Gries
[1976]. A set of locations L in the SMR automaton O is closed under interference from other threads,
if no SMR command issued by a thread different from zt (whose protection we track) can leave the
locations. Formally, we require that for every transition l−−−−−−→f (t ′,∗), g l′ with l ∈ L and l′ < L we have
guard g implying t ′ = zt . We only introduce guarantees EL for sets of locations L that are closed
under interference from other threads.
Type environments Γ are total functions that assign a type to every pointer and every angel in the
code being typed. To fix the notation, Γ(x) = T or x :T ∈ Γ means x is assignedT in environment Γ.
We write Γ, x :T for Γ ⊎ {x :T }. If the type of x does not matter, we just write Γ, x. The initial type
environment Γinit assigns  to every pointer and angel.
Our type system will be control-flow sensitive [Crary et al. 1999; Foster et al. 2002; Hunt and
Sands 2006], which means type judgements take the form
{ Γpre } stmt { Γpost } .
The thing to note is that the type assigned to a pointer/angel is not constant throughout the program
but depends on the commands that have been executed. So we may have the type assignment x :T
in Γpre but x :T ′ in the type environment Γpost with T , T ′.
Control-flow sensitivity requires us to formulate how types change under the execuction of SMR
commands. Towards a definition, we associate with every type a set of locations in O = OBase × O ′.
Guarantee EL already comes with a set of locations. Guarantee S grants safe access to the tracked
address. In terms of locations, it should not be possible to free the address stored in za . We define
SafeLoc(O) to be the largest set of locations in the SMR automaton that is closed under interference
from other threads and for which there is no transition l−−−−−−−→free(a), g l′ with l ∈ SafeLoc(O), l′ not
accepting, and g implying a = za . Guarantee A is characterized by location L2 in OBase . Indeed, a
pointer is active iff OBase is in its initial location. For Lwe also use location L2. The discussion yields:
Loc() := Loc(O) Loc(EL) := L
Loc(A) := {L2} × Loc(O ′) Loc(S) := SafeLoc(O)
Loc(L) := {L2} × Loc(O ′) Loc(T1 ∧T2) := Loc(T1) ∩ Loc(T2) .
The set of locations associated with a type is defined to over-approximate the locations reachable
in the SMR automaton by the (history of the) current computation. With this understanding, it
should be possible for command com to transform x :T into x :T ′ if the locations associated withT ′
over-approximate the post-image under x and com of the locations associated with T . We define
the type transformer relation T , x, com; T ′ by the following conditions:
postx,com(Loc(T )) ⊆ Loc(T ′)
isValid(T ′) ⇒ isValid(T )
{L,A} ∩T ′ ⊆ {L,A} ∩T .
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The over-approximation of the post-image is the first inclusion. The implication states that SMR
commands cannot validate pointers. We can, however, deduce from the fact that the address has
not been retired (A or L) and the SMR command has been executed, that it is safe to access the
address (S). The last inclusion states that SMR commands cannot establish the guarantees L and A.
It is worth pointing out that the relation T , x, com; T ′ only depends on the SMR automaton, up
to a choice of variable names. This means we can tabulate it to guarantee quick access when typing
a program. We also write Γ, com ; Γ′ if we have Γ(x), x, com ; Γ′(x) for all pointers/angels x.
We write Γ ; Γ′ if we take the post-image to be the identity. For an example, refer to Section 6.1.
Guarantees L and A are special in that their sets of locations, Loc(L) and Loc(A), are not closed
under interference. For L, the type rules ensure interference freedom. They do so by enforcing that
retire is not invoked with invalid pointers. Hence, the fact that L-pointers have no valid aliases im-
plies that other threads cannot retire them. So OBase remains in L2 no matter the interference. For A,
the type rules account for interference. We define an operation rm(Γ) that takes an environment
and removes all A guarantees for thread-local pointers and angels:
rm(Γ) := {x :T \ {A} | x :T ∈ Γ ∧ x < shared} ∪ {x : | x ∈ shared} .
The operation also has an effect on shared pointers and angels where it removes all guarantees. The
reasoning is as follows. An interference on a shared pointer or angel may change the address being
pointed to. Guarantees express properties about addresses, indirectly via their pointers. As we do
not have any information about the new address, the pointer receives the empty set of guarantees.
5.3 Type System
Our type system is given in Figure 6. We write ⊢ { Γinit } stmt { Γ } to indicate that { Γinit } stmt { Γ } is
derivable with the given rules.Wewrite ⊢ stmt if there is an environment Γ so that ⊢ { Γinit }stmt{ Γ }.
In this case, we say the program type checks. Soundness will show that a type check entails pointer
race freedom and the absence of double retires.
We distinguish between rules for statements and rules for primitive commands. We assume that
primitive commands com are wrapped inside an atomic block, like beginAtomic; com; endAtomic.
With this assumption, the rules for primitive commands need not handle the fact that guarantee A
is not closed under interference. Interference will be taken into account by the rules for statements.
The assumption of atomic blocks can be established by a simple preprocessing of the program. We
do not make it explicit but assume it has been applied.
The rules for primitive commands, Figure 6a, that are not related to SMR are straightforward.
Rule (assign1) copies the type of the right-hand side pointer to the left-hand side pointer of the
assignment. Additionally, both pointers lose their L qualifier since the command creates an alias.
Rule (assign2) ensures that the dereferenced pointer is valid and then sets the type of the assigned
pointer to the empty type. The assigned pointer does not receive any guarantees since we do not
track guarantees for selectors. Rule (assign3) checks the dereferenced pointer for validity and
removes L from the pointer that is aliased. Data assignments, Rules (assign4), (assign5), and
(assign6), simply check dereferenced pointers for validity. Allocations grant the target pointer the
L guarantee, Rule (malloc). Assumptions of the form p = q check that both pointers are valid
and join the type information, Rule (assume1). Guarantee L is removed due to the alias. All other
assumptions have no effect on the type environment, Rule (assume2). Similarly, Rule (eqal) joins
type information in the case of assertions. However, no validity check is performed and L is not
removed. Rule (active) adds the A guarantee. Note that x is a pointer or an angel. Angels are
always local variables. Their allocation does not justify any guarantees, in particular not L, as they
hold full sets of addresses, Rule (angel). We can also assert membership of an address held by a
pointer in a set of addresses held by an angel, Rule (member).
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(assign1)
T ′ = T \ {L}
{ Γ, p, q :T } p := q { Γ, p :T ′, q :T ′ }
(assign2)
Γ(q) = T isValid(T )
{ Γ, p } p := q.next { Γ, p :}
(assign3)
Γ(p) = T isValid(T ) T ′′ = T ′ \ {L}
{ Γ, q :T ′ } p.next := q { Γ, q :T ′′ }
(assign4)
{ Γ } u := op(u¯) { Γ }
(assign5)
Γ(q) = T isValid(T )
{ Γ } u := q.data { Γ }
(assign6)
Γ(p) = T isValid(T )
{ Γ } p.data := u { Γ }
(malloc)
p < shared T = {L}
{ Γ, p } p := malloc { Γ, p :T }
(assume1)
isValid(T ) isValid(T ′) T ′′ = (T ∧T ′) \ {L}
{ Γ, p :T , q :T ′ } assume p = q { Γ, p :T ′′, q :T ′′ }
(assume2)
cond . p = q
{ Γ } assume cond { Γ }
(eqal)
T ′′ = T ∧T ′
{ Γ, p :T , q :T ′ } @inv p = q { Γ, p :T ′′, q :T ′′ }
(active)
T ′ = T ∧ {A}
{ Γ, x :T } @inv active(x) { Γ, x :T ′ }
(angel)
r < shared
{ Γ, r } @inv angel r { Γ, r :}
(member)
Γ(r) = T ′ T ′′ = T ∧T ′
{ Γ, p :T } @inv p in r { Γ, p :T ′′ }
(enter)
safeEnter(Γ, func(p¯, u¯)) Γ, enter func(p¯, u¯); Γ′
func(p¯, u¯) ≡ retire(p) ∧ Γ(p) = T =⇒ A ∈ T
{ Γ } enter func(p¯, u¯) { Γ′ }
(exit)
Γ, exit func ; Γ′
{ Γ } exit func { Γ′ }
(a) Type rules for primitive commands.
(infer)
Γ1 ; Γ2 { Γ2 } stmt { Γ3 } Γ3 ; Γ4
{ Γ1 } stmt { Γ4 }
(begin)
{ Γ } beginAtomic { Γ }
(end)
{ Γ } endAtomic { rm(Γ) }
(seq)
{ Γ } stmt1 { Γ′ } { Γ′ } stmt2 { Γ′′ }
{ Γ } stmt1; stmt2 { Γ′′ }
(choice)
{ Γ } stmt1 { Γ′ } { Γ } stmt2 { Γ′ }
{ Γ } stmt1 ⊕ stmt2 { Γ′ }
(loop)
{ Γ } stmt { Γ }
{ Γ } stmt∗ { Γ }
(b) Type rules for statements.
Fig. 6. Type rules.
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SMR-related commands may change the entire type environment, rather than manipulating only
the pointers that occur syntactically in the command. This is because of pointer aliasing on the one
hand, and because of the SMR automaton on the other hand (for instance, enterQ has an effect on all
pointers). The post type environment of Rules (enter) and (exit) simply infers guarantees wrt. the
pre type environment and the emitted event. Note that this is the only way to infer SMR-specific
guarantees EL , i.e., these guarantees solely depend on the SMR commands. Moreover, Rule (enter)
performs a pointer race check as defined in Section 4. Predicate safeEnter(Γ, func(p¯, u¯)) evaluates
to true iff the command enter func(p¯, u¯) is guaranteed to be free from pointer races given the
types in Γ. The formalization coincides with Definition 4.2 except that it replaces valid by the
under-approximation isValid(·). A special case of Rule (enter) is the invocation of retire(p), which
requires the argument p to be active. This will prevent double retires.
The rules for statements are given in Figure 6b. Rule (infer) allows for type transformations at
any point, in particular to establish the proper pre/post environments for the Rules (choice) and
(loop). Entering an atomic block, Rule (begin), has no effect on the type environment. Exiting an
atomic block allows for interference. Hence, Rule (exit) removes any type information from the
type environment that can be tampered with by other threads. Sequences of statements are straight-
forward, Rule (seq). Choices require a common pre and post type environment, Rule (choice).
Loops require a type environment that is stable under the loop body, Rule (loop).
5.4 Soundness
Our goal is to show that a successful type check ⊢ stmt implies pointer race freedom and the absence
of double retires. There are two challenges. We already commented on the problematic sequential
to concurrent lifting that motivated the definition of interference freedom. The second difficulty
is that the type system relies on the program’s invariant annotations. The set of computations
ignores these annotations. To reconcile the assumptions about the program, we have to prove
the invariant annotations correct. Interestingly, we can use garbage collection for this purpose,
meaning the invariant annotations only have to hold in ⟦P⟧, although the following results refer
to the computations in O⟦P⟧Adr . Intuitively, garbage collection is sufficient because we have elision
support (cf. Section 3): it allows us to remove frees from a computation and then apply Lemma 3.1.
Pointer race freedom and the absence of double retires will be consequences of a more general
soundness result that makes explicit the information tracked by our type system. We give some
auxiliary definitions that ease the formulation. We write τ |=φ T if there is a location l ∈ Loc(T )
associated with the type T so that (linit ,φ)−−−→H(τ ) (l,φ). The definition is parameterized in the valu-
ation φ determining the thread and the address to be tracked. We write τ , t |= x :T if for every
address a ∈ mτ (x) we have τ |=φ T , with φ = {zt 7→ t , za 7→ a}. The thread is given. The address is
the one held by the pointer or among the ones held by the angel, as determined by the computation.
We write τ , t |= Γ if we have τ , t |= x :T for all type assignments x :T ∈ Γ.
Soundness states that a type environment annotating a program point approximates the history
of every computation reaching this point. Moreover, isValid(·) approximates validity. To make this
precise, we define the relation |= { Γinit } stmt { Γ }. It requires for every τ ∈ O⟦P⟧Adr where thread t
executes stmt to completion that (i) τ , t |= Γ holds, and (ii) for every p :T ∈ Γ with isValid(T ) we
have p ∈ validτ . The soundness result now lifts the syntactic derivation relation ⊢ to the semantic
soundness relation |=.
Theorem 5.1 (Soundness). If inv(⟦P⟧), then ⊢ { Γinit } stmt { Γ } implies |= { Γinit } stmt { Γ }.
Proof Sketch. We proceed by induction on the length of computations τ from O⟦P⟧Adr . During
the proof, we need to access the types encountered by thread t along the execution of stmt. To
make them explicit, we define the straight-line version stmt(τ , t) of stmt induced by τ and t . It is
Proc. ACM Program. Lang., Vol. 4, No. POPL, Article 68. Publication date: January 2020.
68:20 Roland Meyer and Sebastian Wolff
obtained by projecting τ to the commands of thread t . One can show that if we can derive a typing
for the program then we can derive it for the induced straight-line program:
⊢ { Γinit } stmt { Γ } implies ⊢ { Γinit } stmt(τ , t) { Γ } .
The implication should be intuitive. The typing of the overall program can be seen as an intersection
over the typings of the induced straight-line programs.
The induction hypothesis links the current type environment Γ derived for the straight-line
program to the semantic information carried by the computation. The hypothesis strengthens the
requirements (i) and (ii) in the definition of soundness by the following two conditions, where
we assume Γ(x) = T . (iii) If L ∈ T , then x is a pointer that does not have valid aliases. That is,
mτ (x) = mτ (q) implies q < validτ . Note that angels cannot obtain L according to the type rules.
(iv) If A ∈ T , then thread t is in an atomic block. The interesting argumentation in the induction
step is in the case when another thread appends an action, τ .act. It can be summarized as follows.
Property (i) continues to hold for τ .act because the type T of x is closed under interference; for
L and A we argue separately in the following. If L ∈ T , then act cannot use a valid alias of x. In
particular, it cannot retire x according to the premise of Rule (enter). If A ∈ T , then thread t is
in an atomic block and there is no chance to append action act of another thread. The case does
not occur. Consider property (ii). Assume isValid(T ) holds. That is, T contains one of A,L,S. If
L ∈ T or A ∈ T , then the above reasoning for (i) already implies (ii). Otherwise, we have S ∈ T .
It implies (ii) because S is closed under interference. Property (iii) follows from the fact that act
cannot contain, and thus cannot create, a valid alias of x. Lastly, to conclude property (iv), note
that another thread cannot append an action while t is inside an atomic block. □
The first consequence of soundness is that a successful type check implies pointer race freedom.
Phrased differently, the rules from Figure 6 allow for a successful typing only if there are no pointer
races. That is, our type system performs a pointer race freedom check indeed.
Proposition 5.2. If inv(⟦P⟧), then ⊢P implies that O⟦P⟧Adr is pointer-race-free.
The proposition gives an effective means of checking the premise of Theorem 4.1: determine
a typing using the proposed type system (cf. Section 7) and discharge the invariant annotations
using an off-the-shelf verification tool (cf. Section 8).
Proof Sketch. To see the proposition, consider τ .act ∈ O⟦P⟧Adr . We focus on the case where
the last action is a dereference, say due to command com being p := q.next. The remaining cases
in the definition of pointer races are similar. We show that the dereference is safe, q ∈ validτ .
Let thread t perform the dereference. Let stmt(τ .act, t) = stmt; com be the induced straight-line
program. As observed above, since the program type checks also stmt; com will type check. Say
we can derive { Γinit } stmt; com { Γ }. The only way to type a composition stmt; com is Rule (seq).
It requires an environment Γ′ so that { Γinit } stmt { Γ′ } and { Γ′ } com { Γ } are derivable. The only
way to type an assignment p := q.next is Rule (assign2). By its premise, Γ′(q) = T with isValid(T ).
Theorem 5.1 yields q ∈ validτ . The dereference of q is safe. □
The second consequence of soundness is that a successful type check means the program does not
perform double retires. This is the precondition for a meaningful application of OBase (cf. Section 3).
Proposition 5.3. If inv(⟦P⟧), then ⊢P implies that O⟦P⟧AdrAdr does not perform double retires.
The argumentation is along the lines of Proposition 5.2. To perform a retire, Rule (enter) requires
the pointer to be active. This, in turn, means OBase is in state L2. The state, however, can only be
reached if there were no earlier retires of the address or the earlier retires have been followed by a
free. In both cases, we do not have a double retire.
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OBase × OEBR
L2, L4 L2, L5 L8
L3, L4 L3, L5 L3, L6
F
F
F
F F R
R
R
exit leaveQ(t), t = zt
enter enterQ(t), t = zt
exit leaveQ(t), t = zt
enter enterQ(t), t = zt
F := free(a), a = za R := enter retire(t ,a), a = za
A Eacc S
Fig. 7. Cross-product SMR automaton for OBase × OEBR and EBR-specific types.
The next section gives an in-depth example on how to apply our type system. The two sections
thereafter automate the checks in Theorem 5.1: we give an efficient algorithm for type inference ⊢P
and show how to discharge the invariants inv(⟦P⟧)with the help of off-the-shelf verification tools.
6 EXAMPLE
We apply our type system to Michael&Scott’s queue with EBR from Section 2. Here, a single custom
guarantee Eacc is sufficient. We define Loc(Eacc) to be those locations where thread zt is guarantee
to have returned from a call to leaveQ but has not yet invoked enterQ. That is, Eacc captures when
zt is accessing the data structure. The sets of locations represented by A, S, and Eacc can be read of
the cross-product SMR automaton OBase × OEBR in Figure 7. It is worth pointing out that Loc(S)
does not contain location (L2, L4). For a set containing (L2, L4) to be closed under interference we
would need to have (L3, L4) in that set. However, (L3, L4) allows for a free of za and thus must not
belong to Loc(S) by definition.
In the following, we illustrate the type transformer relation, the use of angels, the typing of
programs, and explain how to find suitable annotations for the type inference to go through.
6.1 Type Transformer Relation
We illustrate the computation of the type transformer relation for exitleaveQ and the inference of S.
First, we establish the type transformer relation , x, exit leaveQ ; Eacc . This boils down to
checking postx,exit leaveQ(Loc()) ⊆ Loc(Eacc) because the remaining properties of the type trans-
former relation are trivially satisfied (we do not add any of {A,L,S}). The empty type corresponds
to no knowledge about previously executed SMR commands, which means Loc() = L with L the
set of all locations of OBase × OEBR. We compute the post-image of L wrt. x and exit leaveQ in the
SMR automaton from Figure 7. To this end, we consider all transitions labeled with exit leaveQ(t).
The pointer or angel x does not play a role. We derive the desired inclusion as follows:
postx,exit leaveQ(Loc()) = postx,exit leaveQ(L) = L \ {(L2, L4), (L3, L4)} = Loc(Eacc) .
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Second, we show how to infer S. From Figure 7 we know that Eacc alone does not yield S because
of location (L3, L5); we also need A. We establish Eacc ∧ A ; Eacc ∧ A ∧ S. Since Eacc ∧ A is
valid and we do not add L, the key task is to establish Loc(Eacc ∧ A) ⊆ Loc(Eacc ∧ A ∧ S). As
Loc(Eacc ∧ A) ⊆ Loc(Eacc ∧ A) trivially holds, it suffices to show Loc(Eacc ∧ A) ⊆ Loc(S):
Loc(Eacc ∧ A) = Loc(Eacc) ∩ Loc(A) = {(L2, L5), L8} ⊆ {(L2, L5), (L3, L6), L8} = Loc(S) .
6.2 Angels
73 @inv angel r;
74 beginAtomic
75 enter leaveQ ();
76 exit leaveQ;
77 @inv active(r);
78 endAtomic
79 // ...
80 Node* head = Head;
81 Node* tail = Tail;
82 @inv head in r;
83 Node* next = head ->next;
84 // ...
85 @inv next in r;
86 data_t output = next ->data;
87 // ...
88 enter exitQ ();
89 exit exitQ;
90 // ..
Fig. 8. Excerpt of dequeue using angel r .
To illustrate the use of angels, consider the excerpt of the
dequeue operation depicted in Figure 8. Note that calls to
SMR functions lead to two consecutive commands. The
atomic block ensures the commands are executed with-
out interruption by other threads. To infer it, we rely on
standard moverness arguments [Lipton 1975]: command
enterleaveQ() is a right-mover because it does not affect
the memory nor the observer OBase × OEBR. The call to
leaveQ guarantees that no currently active address is
reclaimed until enterQ is called. It thus protects an un-
bounded number of addresses before a thread acquires a
pointer to them. Later, when a thread acquired a pointer
to such an address in order to access it, the address may
no longer be active and thus the type system may not be
able to infer S (cf. Section 6.1). To overcome this problem,
we use an angel r . Given its angelic semantics, r will
capture all addresses that are protected by the leaveQ
call, Lines 73 to 77. Later, upon accessing/dereferencing
a pointer p, we make sure that r captures the address
pointed to by p, Lines 82 and 85.
6.3 Typing
We give a typing for the code from Figure 8 in Figure 9. We start in Line 91 with type  for all
pointers and the angel r . The allocation of r in Line 92 has no effect on the type assignment. The
same holds when entering an atomic block, Line 94. Line 96 invokes leaveQ. Again, the types
are not affected because the SMR automaton has no transitions labeled with enter leaveQ. Next,
the invocation returns, Line 98. Following the discussion from Section 6.1, we obtain Eacc for r ,
Line 99. It is worth pointing out that r is treated like an ordinary pointer when it comes to the type
transformer relation.
To capture in the type system the set of addresses that can be safely accessed in the subsequent
code, we want to lift Eacc of r to S. We annotate r to hold a set of active addresses, Line 100. This
yields type Eacc ∧ A for r , Line 101. As explained above, we can now lift this type to Eacc ∧ A ∧ S,
Line 102. Recall that the allocation of r in Line 92 is angelic. That is, the addresses held by r will
indeed be chosen to be active.
In the subsequent code, we already added annotations (cf. Section 6.2) ensuring that accessed/deref-
erenced pointers are captured by the angel r . For instance, Line 112 requires the address of head to
be captured by r . That this is the case indeed is established when the annotations are discharged.
For the typing, we can copy Eacc ∧ S from r over to head. As a consequence, the dereference of
head in Line 114 is safe. Similarly, we require next to be captured by r in Line 117 such that the
dereference in Line 119 is safe.
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91 { Head ,head ,next ,r: }
92 @inv angel r;
93 { Head ,head ,next ,r: }
94 beginAtomic
95 { Head ,head ,next ,r: }
96 enter leaveQ ();
97 { Head ,head ,next ,r: }
98 exit leaveQ;
99 { Head ,head ,next:, r:Eacc }
100 @inv active(r);
101 { Head ,head ,next:, r:Einv ∧ A }
102 { Head ,head ,next:, r:Einv ∧ A ∧ S }
103 endAtomic
104 { Head ,head ,next:, r:Einv ∧ S }
105 // ...
106 // ...
107 { Head ,head ,next:, r:Einv ∧ S }
108 Node* head = Head;
109 { Head ,head ,next:, r:Einv ∧ S }
110 // ...
111 { Head ,head ,next:, r:Einv ∧ S }
112 @inv head in r;
113 { Head ,next:, head ,r:Einv ∧ S }
114 Node* next = head ->next;
115 // ...
116 { Head ,next:, head ,r:Einv ∧ S }
117 @inv next in r;
118 { Head:, next ,head ,r:Einv ∧ S }
119 data_t output = next ->data;
120 // ...
Fig. 9. Typing for EBR using angels.
6.4 Annotations
We explain our algorithm to automatically add to the program in Figure 2 the annotations in
Figure 8 in order to arrive at the typing in Figure 9. We focus on the dereference of head in Line 83.
Without annotations, the type inference will fail because it cannot conclude that head is guaranteed
to be valid. To fix this, we implemented a sequence of tactics that we invoke one after the other. If
none of them fixes the issue, we give up the type inference and report the failure to the user.
The first tactic simply adds an @inv active(head) annotation to Line 83. This makes head valid
and the type inference go through for Line 83. However, we should only add the annotation if it
actually holds. To check this, we employ the technique from Section 8. In this particular case, we
will find that the annotation does not hold; so we try to fix the problem with another tactic.
The second tactic adds an angel r to the (syntactically) most recent leaveQ call. We use a template
to transform the sequence enter leaveQ(); exit leaveQ; to the code from Lines 73-78. (A subsequent
use of this tactic will skip this step and reuse the existing angel.) Then, we fix Line 83 by adding
the annotation @inv head in r before it, as shown in Line 82. This makes head valid. Whether the
annotation holds is again checked with the technique from Section 8.
It is worth pointing out that the second tactic is EBR-specific. From our experience, every SMR
algorithm/automaton comes with a small set of tactics that significantly help finding the right
annotations—EBR requires the above tactic and HP requires two specific tactics. We do not believe
that there is a silver bullet of tactics since SMR algorithms may vary greatly, as seen in the cases
of EBR and HP. Theoretically speaking, one could find the annotations by an exhaustive search
(finitely many angels will suffice), but this will not scale.
6.5 Hazard Pointers
Our approach applies to lock-free data structures with hazard pointers just as well as in the case of
EBR. The main difference is that HP typically does not require angels because pointers are protected
after they are acquired. However, the size of the SMR automaton for HP grows in the number of
hazard pointers. For two hazard pointers it consists of 17 locations. Consider Appendix A for details.
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Φ(X , com,Y ) : sp(X , com) ⊑ Y
Φ(X , stmt1; stmt2,Y ) : Φ(X , stmt1,Z ) ∧ Φ(Z , stmt2,Y ), Z fresh
Φ(X , stmt1 ⊕ stmt2,Y ) : Φ(X , stmt1,Y ) ∧ Φ(X , stmt2,Y )
Φ(X , stmt∗,Y ) : Φ(Y , stmt,Y ) ∧ X ⊑ Y
Fig. 10. Constraint system Φ(X , stmt,Y ).
7 TYPE INFERENCE
We show that type inference is surprisingly efficient, namely quadratic time.
Theorem 7.1. Given a program stmt, the type inference ⊢ stmt is computable in time O(| stmt |2).
As common in type systems [Pierce 2002], our algorithm for type inference is constraint-based.
We associate with the program stmt a constraint system Φ(Γinit , stmt,X ). The variables X are
interpreted over the set of type environments enriched with a value ⊤ for a failed type inference.
The correspondence between solving the constraint system and type inference will be the following.
An environment Γ can be assigned to X in order to solve the constraint system if and only if
{ Γinit } stmt { Γ }. As a consequence, a non-trivial solution to X will show ⊢ stmt.
Our type inference algorithm will be a fixed-point computation. The canonical choice for a
domain over which to compute would be the set of types ordered by;. The problem is that types
of the form EL and EL ∧ EL′ with L ⊆ L′ are comparable, EL ; EL ∧ EL′ and EL ∧ EL′ ; EL . This
is not merely a theoretical issue of the domain being a quasi instead of a partial order. It means we
compute over too large a domain, namely a powerset lattice where we should have used a lattice of
antichains [Wulf et al. 2006]. We factorize the set of all types along such equivalences; ∩;−1.
The resulting AntiChainTypes := (Types/;∩;−1 ,;) is a complete lattice [Birkhoff 1948].
Type environments can be understood as total functions into this antichain lattice. We enrich the
set of functions by a value ⊤ to indicate a failed type inference. The result is the complete lattice of
enriched type environments
Envs⊤ := (AntiChainTypesVars ∪ {⊤},⊑) .
Between environments, we define Γ ⊑ Γ′ to hold if for all x ∈ Vars we have Γ(x); Γ′(x). This lifts; to the function domain. Value ⊤ is defined to be the largest element.
The constraint system Φ(Γinit , stmt,X ) is defined in Figure 10. We proceed by induction over the
structure of statements and maintain triples (X , stmt,Y ). The idea is that statement stmt will turn
the enriched type environment stored in variable X into an environment upper bounded by Y .
Consider the case of basic commands. We will define sp(X , com) to be the strongest enriched type
environment resulting from the environment in X when applying command com. The constraint
sp(X , com) ⊑ Y requires Y to be an upper bound. Note that Y still contains safe type information.
For a sequential composition, we introduce a fresh variable Z for the enriched type environment
determined by stmt1 from X . We then require stmt2 to transform this environment into Y . For a
choice, Y should upper bound the effects of both stmt1 and stmt2 on X . This guarantees that the
type information is valid independent of which branch is chosen. For iterations, we have to make
sure Y is an upper bound for the effect of arbitrarily many applications of stmt to X . This means
the environment in Y is at least X because the iteration may be skipped. Moreover, if we apply
stmt to Y then we should again obtain at most the environment in Y .
It remains to define sp(X , com), the strongest enriched type environment resulting from X under
command com. We refer to the typing rules in Figure 6 and extract precom and upcom. The former
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is a predicate on environments capturing the premise of the rule associate with command com.
To give an example, for Rule (assign2) the predicate precom(Γ) is isValid(T ) with T = Γ(q). The
latter is a function on environments. It captures the update of the given environment as defined
in the consequence of the corresponding rule. For (assign2), the update upcom(Γ) is Γ[p 7→ ].
The strongest enriched environment preserves the information that a type inference has failed,
sp(⊤, com) := ⊤, for all commands. For a given environment, we set
sp(Γ, com) := precom(Γ) ? upcom(Γ) : ⊤ .
We evaluate the premise of the rule. If it does not hold, the type inference will fail and return ⊤.
Otherwise, we determine the update of the current type environment, upcom(Γ). We rely on the
fact that sp(·, com) is monotonic and hence (as the domains are finite) continuous.
We apply a Kleene iteration to obtain the least solution to the constraint system Φ(Γinit , stmt,X ).
The least solution is a function lsol that assigns to each variable in the system an enriched type
environment. We focus on variable X that captures the effect of the overall program on the initial
type environment. Then lsol(X ) is the strongest type environment that can be obtained by a
successful type inference. This is the key correspondence.
Proposition 7.2 (Principle Types). Consider Φ(Γinit , stmt,X ). Then lsol(X ) = intersectionsqtext ⊢{ Γinit } stmt { Γ } Γ.
Hence, lsol(X ) , ⊤ if and only if ⊢ stmt.
It remains to check the complexity of the Kleene iteration. In the lattice of enriched type
environments, chains have length at most |Var | · | {A,L,S,E1, . . . ,En} | + 1. This is linear in
the size of the program as the guarantees only depend on the SMR algorithm, which is not part
of the input. With one variable for each program point, also the number of variables in the
constraint system is linear in the size of the program. It remains to compute sp(·, com) for the
Kleene approximants. This can be done in constant time. The premise and the update of a rule only
modify a constant number of variables. Moreover, we can look-up the effect of commands on a
type in constant time. Combined, we obtain the overall quadratic complexity.
8 INVARIANT CHECKING
The type system from Section 5 relies on invariant annotations in the program under scrutiny
in order to incorporate runtime behavior that is typically not available to a type system. For the
soundness of our approach, we require those annotations to be correct. Recall from Section 5 that
the annotations need only hold in the garbage collected (GC) semantics. We now show how to
use an off-the-shelf GC verifier to discharge the invariant annotations fully automatically. In our
experiments, we rely on cave [Vafeiadis 2009, 2010a,b].
Making the link to tools is non-trivial. Our programs feature programming constructs that are
typically not available in off-the-shelf verifiers. We present a source-to-source translation that
replaces those constructs by standard ones. The constructs to be replaced are SMR commands,
invariants guaranteeing pointers to be active (not retired), and invariants centered around angels. For
the translation, we only rely on ordinary assertions assert cond and non-deterministic assignments
havoc(p) to pointers. Both are usually available in verification tools.
The correspondence between the original program P and its translation inst(P) is documented
in Theorem 8.1 and as required. Predicate safe(·) evaluates to true iff the assertions hold, i.e.,
verification is successful. Recall that ⟦P⟧ is the GC semantics where addresses are neither freed
nor reclaimed. Note that this semantics is the weakest a tool can assume. Our instrumentation also
works if the GC tool collects and subsequently reuses garbage nodes.
Theorem 8.1 (Soundness and Completeness). We have inv(⟦P⟧) iff safe(⟦inst(P)⟧). The
source-to-source translation is linear in size.
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inst(stmt∗) := inst(stmt)∗ inst(enter func(p¯, u¯)) := skip
inst(stmt1 ⊕ stmt2) := inst(stmt1) ⊕ inst(stmt2) inst(exit func) := skip
inst(stmt1; stmt2) := inst(stmt1); inst(stmt2) inst(@inv p = q) := assert p = q
inst(com) := com
inst(enter retire(q)) := skip ⊕ (retire_ptr := q; retire_flag := true)
inst(@inv active(p)) := assert !retire_flag ∨ retire_ptr , p
inst(@inv angel r) := havoc(r); included_r := false; failed_r := false
inst(@inv q in r) := skip ⊕ (assume q = r ; assert !failed_r ; included_r := true)
inst(@inv active(r)) := skip ⊕ (assume retire_flag ∧ retire_ptr = r ;
assert !included_r ; failed_r := true
)
Fig. 11. Source-to-source translation replacing SMR commands and invariant annotations.
The source-to-source translation is defined in Figure 11. It preserves the structure of the program
and does not modify ordinary commands. SMR calls and returns will be taken care of by the type
system. They are ignored, except for retire. Invariants guaranteeing pointer equality yield assertions.
The purpose of invariants @inv active(p) is to guarantee that the address held by the pointer
has not been retired since its last allocation. The idea of our translation is to guess the moment
of failure, the retire function after which such an invariant will be checked. We instrument the
program by an additional pointer retire_ptr and a Boolean variable retire_flag. Both are shared.
A retire translates into a non-deterministic choice between skipping the command or being the
retire after which an invariant will fail. In the latter case, the address is stored in retire_ptr and
retire_flag is raised. Note that the instrumentation is tailored towards garbage collection. As long
as retire_ptr points to the address, it will not be reallocated. Therefore, we do not run the risk
of the address becoming active ever again. The invariant @inv active(p) now translates into an
assertion that checks the address of p for being the retired one and the flag for being raised. A
thing to note is that the instrumentation of the retire function is not atomic. Hence, there may be
an interleaving where a pointer has been stored in retire_ptr but the flag has not yet been raised.
The assertion would consider this interleaving safe. However, if there is such an interleaving, there
is also one where the assertion fails. Hence, atomicity is not needed.
For invariants involving angels, the idea of the instrumentation is the same as for pointers,
guessing the moment of failure. What makes the task more difficult is the angelic semantics. We
cannot just guess a value for the angel and show that it makes an invariant fail. Instead, we
have to show that, no matter how the value is chosen, it inevitably leads to an invariant failure.
This resembles the idea of having a strategy to win against an opponent in a turn-based game, a
common phenomenon when quantifier alternation is involved [Grädel et al. 2002]. Another source
of difficulty is the fact that angels are second-order variables storing sets. We tackle the problem by
guessing an element in the set for which verification fails.
The instrumentation proceeds as follows. We consider angels r to be ordinary pointers. For each
angel, we add two Boolean variables included_r and failed_r that are local to the thread. When
we allocate an angel using @inv angel r , we guess the address that (i) will inevitably belong to the
set of addresses held by the angel and (ii) for which an active invariant will fail. To document that
we are sure of (i), we raise flag included_r . For (ii), we use failed_r . If we are sure of both facts,
we let verification fail. Note that we can derive the facts in arbitrary order.
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An invariant @inv q in r forces the angel to contain the address of q. This may establish (i). The
reason it does not establish (i) for sure is that the angel denotes a set of addresses, and the address of
q could be different from the one for which an active invariant fails. Hence, we non-deterministically
choose between skipping the invariant or comparing q to r . If the comparison succeeds, we raise
included_r . Moreover, we check (ii). If the address has been retired, we report a bug.
Invariant @inv active(r) forces all addresses held by the angel to be active. In the instrumented
program, r is a pointer that we compare to retire_ptr introduced above. If the address has been
retired, we are sure about (ii) and document this by raising failed_r . If we already know (i), the
address inevitably belongs to the set held by the angel, verification fails.
9 EVALUATION
We implemented our approach in a C++ tool called seal.3. As stated before, we use the state-of-
the-art tool cave [Vafeiadis 2009, 2010a,b] as a back-end verifier for discharging annotations and
checking linearizability. For the type inference, our tool computes the most precise guarantees
EL on-the-fly; there is no need for the user to manually specify them. To substantiate the claim
of usefulness of our approach, we evaluated seal on examples from the literature. We considered
the following data structures: Treiber’s stack [Michael 2002b; Treiber 1986], Michael&Scott’s lock-
free queue [Michael 2002b; Michael and Scott 1996], the DGLM queue [Doherty et al. 2004], the
Vechev&Yahav CAS set [Vechev and Yahav 2008], the Vechev&Yahav DCAS set [Vechev and Yahav
2008], the ORVYY set [O’Hearn et al. 2010], and Michael’s set [Michael 2002a]. Our benchmarks
include a version of each data structure for hazard pointers (HP) [Michael 2002b] and epoch-based
reclamation (EBR) [Fraser 2004]. We adapted the GC implementations of the Vechev&Yahav DCAS
set, the Vechev&Yahav CAS set, and the ORVYY set given in the literature to use HP/EBR.
Our findings are listed in Table 1. The experiments were conducted on an Intel i5-8600K@3.6GHz
with 16GB of RAM. The table includes the time taken (i) for the type inference, (ii) for discharging
the invariant annotations, and (iii) to check linearizability. We mark tasks with ✓ if they were
successful, with ✗ if they failed, and with if they timed out after 12h wall time.
Our approach is capable of verifying most of the lock-free data structures we considered. Compar-
ing the total runtime with our competitors [Meyer andWolff 2019], the only other approach capable
of handling lock-free data structures with general SMR algorithms, we experience a speed-up of
over two orders of magnitude on examples like Michael&Scott’s queue. Besides the speed-up, we
are the first to automatically verify lock-free set algorithms that use SMR.
We were not able to discharge the annotations of the DGLM queue and Michael’s set. Imprecision
in the thread-modular abstraction of our back-end verifier resulted in false-positives being reported.
Hence, we cannot guarantee the soundness of our analysis in these cases. This is no limitation of
our approach, it is a shortcoming of the back-end verifier. Meyer and Wolff [2019] reported a similar
issue that they solved by manually providing hints to improve the precision of their analysis.
The annotation checks for set implementations are interesting. While the HP version of an
implementation is typicallymore involved than the corresponding version using EBR, the annotation
checks for the HP version are more efficient. The reason for this could be that EBR implementations
require angels. The conjecture suggests that discharging angels is harder for cave than discharging
active annotations although our instrumentation uses the same idea for both annotation types.
For the benchmarks from Table 1 we preprocessed the implementations by applying mover
types [Lipton 1975], a well-known program transformation (cf. Section 10). Intuitively, a command
is a mover if it can be reordered with commands of other threads. This allows for the command
to be moved to the next command of the same thread, effectively constructing an atomic block
3Available at: https://wolff09.github.io/seal/
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Table 1. Experimental results for verifying singly-linked data structures using safe memory reclamation.
The experiments were conducted on an Intel i5-8600K@3.6GHz with 16GB of RAM.
SMR Program Type Inference Annotations Linearizability
HP
Treiber’s stack 0.7s ✓ 12s ✓ 1s ✓
Opt. Treiber’s stack 0.5s ✓ 11s ✓ 1s ✓
Michael&Scott’s queue 0.6s ✓ 12s ✓ 4s ✓
DGLM queue 0.6s ✓ 1s ✗a 5s ✓
Vechev&Yahav DCAS set 1.2s ✓ 13s ✓ 98s ✓
Vechev&Yahav CAS set 1.2s ✓ 3.5h ✓ 42m ✓
ORVYY set 1.2s ✓ 3.2h ✓ 47m ✓
Michael’s set 1.2s ✓ 90s ✗a —
EBR
Treiber’s stack 0.6s ✓ 10s ✓ 1s ✓
Michael&Scott’s queue 0.7s ✓ 16s ✓ 5s ✓
DGLM queue 0.7s ✓ 1s ✗a 6s ✓
Vechev&Yahav DCAS set 0.8s ✓ 38s ✓ 200s ✓
Vechev&Yahav CAS set 0.8s ✓ 7h ✓ 42m ✓
ORVYY set 0.9s ✓ 7h ✓ 47m ✓
Michael’s set 0.2s ✓ 22s ✗a —
aFalse-positive due to imprecision in the back-end verifier.
containing the mover and the next command. What is remarkable in our setting is that SMR
commands (enter, exit, free) always move over ordinary memory commands, and vice versa.
(Technically, this requires enter commands to contain only thread-local variables, a property than
be checked/established easily.) As a result, we can findmovers for memory commands using existing
techniques. For SMR commands, movers can be read of the SMR automaton. Our tool is able to find
and apply movers. Due to space constraints, we omit a thorough discussion of the matter.
10 RELATEDWORK
Safe Memory Reclamation. Besides EBR and HP there is another basic SMR technique: reference
counting (RC). RC extends records with an integer field counting the number of pointers to the
record. Safely modifying counters in a lock-free manner, however, requires hazard pointers [Herlihy
et al. 2005] or a mostly unavailable CAS for two arbitrary memory locations [Detlefs et al. 2001].
Recent efforts in developing SMR algorithms have mostly combined existing SMR techniques. For
example, DEBRA [Brown 2015] is an optimized EBR implementation. Harris [2001] modifies EBR to
store epochs inside records. Hyaline [Nikolaev and Ravindran 2019] is used like EBR. Optimized
HP implementations include the work by Aghazadeh et al. [2014], the work by Dice et al. [2016],
and Cadence [Balmau et al. 2016]. Dynamic Collect [Dragojevic et al. 2011], StackTrack [Alistarh
et al. 2014], and ThreadScan [Alistarh et al. 2015] are HP-esque implementations exploring the use
of operating system and hardware support. Drop the Anchor [Braginsky et al. 2013], Optimistic
Access [Cohen and Petrank 2015b], Automatic Optimistic Access [Cohen and Petrank 2015a], QSense
[Balmau et al. 2016], Hazard Eras [Ramalhete and Correia 2017], and Interval-based Reclamation
[Wen et al. 2018] combine EBR and HP. Free Access [Cohen 2018] automates the application of
Automatic Optimistic Access. While the method promises to be correct by construction, we believe
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that performance-critical applications choose the SMR technique based on performance rather than
ease of use. The demand for automated verification remains. Beware&Cleanup [Gidenstam et al.
2005] combines HP and RC. Isolde [Yang and Wrigstad 2017] combines EBR and RC. We believe our
approach can handle other SMR algorithms besides EBR and HP as well.
Memory Safety. We use our type system to show that a program is free from pointer races,
meaning that it is memory safe. There are a number of related tools that can check pointer
programs for memory safety. For example: a combination of ccured [Necula et al. 2002] and blast
[Henzinger et al. 2003] due to Beyer et al. [2005], invader [Yang et al. 2008], xisa [Laviron et al.
2010], slayer [Berdine et al. 2011], infer [Calcagno and Distefano 2011], forester [Holík et al.
2013], predator [Dudka et al. 2013; Holík et al. 2016], and aprove [Ströder et al. 2017]. These tools
can only handle sequential code. Moreover, unlike our type system, they include memory/shape
abstractions to identify unsafe pointer operations. We delegate this task to a back-end verifier with
the help of annotations. That is, if the related tools were to support concurrent programs, they were
candidates for the back-end. We used cave [Vafeiadis 2010a,b] as it can also prove linearizability.
Despite the differences, we point out that the combination of blast and ccured [Beyer et al.
2005] is close to our approach in spirit. ccured performs a type check of the program under scrutiny
which checks for unsafe memory operations. While doing so, it annotates pointer operations in
the program with run-time checks in case the type check could not establish the operation to be
safe. The run-time checks are then discharged using blast. The approach is limited to sequential
programs. Moreover, we incorporate the behavior of the SMR. Finally, our type system is more
lightweight and we discharge the invariants in a simpler semantics without memory deletions.
Castegren and Wrigstad [2017] give a type system that guarantees the absence of data races.
Types encode a notion of ownership that prevents non-owning threads from accessing a node.
Their method is tailored towards GC and requires to rewrite programs with appropriate type
specifiers. Recently, Kuru and Gordon [2019] presented a type system for checking the correct use
of RCU. Unlike our approach, they integrate a fixed shape analysis and a fixed RCU specification.
This makes the type system considerably more complicated and the type check potentially more
expensive. Unfortunately, Kuru and Gordon [2019] did not implement their approach.
Besides memory safety, tools like invader, slayer, infer, forester, predator, and the type
system by Kuru and Gordon [2019] discover memory leaks. A successful type check with our
type system does not imply the absence of memory leaks. We believe that the outcome of our
analysis could help a leak detection tool. For example, by performing a linearizability check to find
the abstract data type the data structure under consideration implements. We consider a closer
investigation of the matter as future work.
Typestate. Typestate [Strom and Yemini 1986] extents an object’s type to carry a notion of state.
The methods of an object can be annotated to modify this state and to be available only in a certain
state. Existing analyses checking for methods being called only in the appropriate state include
[Bierhoff and Aldrich 2007; DeLine and Fähndrich 2004; Fähndrich and DeLine 2002; Fink et al.
2006; Foster et al. 2002]. Our types can be understood as typestates for pointers (and the objects
they reference) geared towards SMR. However, whereas an object’s typestate has a global character,
our types reflect a thread’s local perception. Das et al. [2002] give a typestate analysis based on
symbolic execution to increase precision. Similarly, we increase the applicability of our approach
by using annotations that are discharged by a back-end verifier. For a more detailed overview on
typestate, refer to [Ancona et al. 2016].
Program Logics. There are several program logics for verifying concurrent programs with heap.
Examples are: sagl [Feng et al. 2007], rgsep [Vafeiadis and Parkinson 2007] (used by cave [Vafeiadis
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2010b]), lrg [Feng 2009], Deny-Guarantee [Dodds et al. 2009], cap [Dinsdale-Young et al. 2010],
hlrg [Fu et al. 2010], and the work by Gotsman et al. [2013]. Program logics are conceptually related
to our type system. However, such logics integrate further ingredients to successfully verify intricate
lock-free data structures [Turon et al. 2014]. Most importantly, they include memory abstractions,
like (concurrent) separation logic [Brookes 2004; O’Hearn 2004; O’Hearn et al. 2001; Reynolds 2002],
and mechanisms to reason about thread interference, like rely-guarantee [Jones 1983]. This makes
them much more complex than our type system. We deliberately avoid incorporating a memory
abstraction into our type system to keep it as flexible as possible. Instead, we use annotations
to delegate the shape analysis to a back-end verifier, achieving modularity in verifying the data
structure and its memory management separately. Moreover, accounting for thread interference
in our type system boils down to defining guarantees as closed sets of locations and removing
guarantee A upon exiting atomic blocks.
Oftentimes, invariant-based reasoning about interference turns out too restrictive for verification.
To overcome this, program logics like caresl [Turon et al. 2013], fcsl [Nanevski et al. 2014], icap
[Svendsen and Birkedal 2014], tada [da Rocha Pinto et al. 2014], gps [Turon et al. 2014], and
iris [Jung et al. 2015] make use of protocols. A protocol captures possible thread interference, for
example, using state transition systems. (Rely-guarantee is a particular instantiation of a protocol
[Jung et al. 2015; Turon et al. 2013].) In our approach, SMR automata are protocols that govern
memory deletions and protections, that is, describe the influence of SMR-related actions among
threads. Our types describe a thread’s local, per-pointer perception of that global protocol.
Besides protocols, recent logics like caresl, tada, and iris integrate reasoning in the spirit of
atomicity abstraction/refinement [Dijkstra 1982; Lipton 1975]. Intuitively, they allow the client
of a fine-grained module to be verified against a coarse-grained specification of the module. For
example, a client of a data structure can be verified against its abstract data type, provided the data
structure refines the abstract data type. Following [Meyer and Wolff 2019], we use the same idea
wrt. SMR algorithms: we consider SMR automata instead of the actual SMR implementations.
Some program logics can also unveil memory leaks [Bizjak et al. 2019; Gotsman et al. 2013].
Linearizability. Linearizability testing [Burckhardt et al. 2010; Cerný et al. 2010; Emmi and Enea
2018; Emmi et al. 2015; Horn and Kroening 2015; Liu et al. 2009, 2013; Lowe 2017; Travkin et al.
2013; Vechev and Yahav 2008; Yang et al. 2017; Zhang 2011] is a bug hunting technique to find
non-linearizable executions in large code bases. Since we focus on verification, we do not go
into the details of linearizability testing. However, it could be worthwhile to use a linearizability
tester instead of a verification back-end in our approach to provide faster feedback during the
development process and only use a verifier once the development is considered finished.
Verification techniques for linearizability fall into two categories: manual techniques (including
tool-supported but not fully automated techniques) and automatic techniques. Manual approaches
require the human checker to have a deep understanding of the proof techniques as well as the
program under scrutiny—in our case, this includes a deep understanding of the lock-free data
structure as well as the SMR implementation. This may be the reason why many manual proofs
do not consider reclamation [Bäumler et al. 2011; Bouajjani et al. 2017; Colvin et al. 2005, 2006;
Delbianco et al. 2017; Derrick et al. 2011; Doherty and Moir 2009; Elmas et al. 2010; Groves 2007,
2008; Hemed et al. 2015; Henzinger et al. 2013; Jonsson 2012; Khyzha et al. 2017; Liang and Feng
2013; Liang et al. 2012, 2014; O’Hearn et al. 2010; Schellhorn et al. 2012; Sergey et al. 2015a,b]. There
are fewer works that consider reclamation [Dodds et al. 2015; Doherty et al. 2004; Fu et al. 2010;
Gotsman et al. 2013; Krishna et al. 2018; Parkinson et al. 2007; Tofan et al. 2011]. (The work by
Gotsman et al. [2013] checks memory safety and discovers memory leaks as well.) For a more
detailed overview of manual techniques, we refer to the survey by Dongol and Derrick [2015].
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The landscape of related work for automated linearizability proofs is similar to its manual
counterpart. Most automated approaches ignore memory reclamation, that is, assume a garbage
collector [Abdulla et al. 2016; Amit et al. 2007; Berdine et al. 2008; Segalov et al. 2009; Sethi et al.
2013; Vafeiadis 2010a,b; Vechev et al. 2009; Zhu et al. 2015]. When reclamation is not considered,
memory abstractions are simpler and more efficient, they can exploit ownership guarantees [Bornat
et al. 2005; Boyland 2003] and the resulting thread-local reasoning techniques [O’Hearn et al. 2001;
Reynolds 2002]. Few works [Abdulla et al. 2013; Haziza et al. 2016; Holík et al. 2017; Meyer and
Wolff 2019] address the challenge of verifying lock-free data structures under manual memory
management. Besides Meyer and Wolff [2019], they use hand-crafted semantics that allow for
accessing deleted memory. The work by Meyer and Wolff [2019] is the closest related. We build on
their programming model and their reduction result as discussed in Sections 3 and 4, respectively.
Moreover, we rely to their results for proving an SMR implementation against an SMR automaton.
Moverness. Movers where first introduced by Lipton [1975]. They were later generalized to
arbitrary safety properties [Back 1989; Doeppner 1977; Lamport and Schneider 1989]. Movers are a
widely applied enabling technique for verification. To ease the verification task, the program is
made more atomic without cutting away behavior. Because we use standard moverness arguments,
we do not give an extensive overview. Flanagan et al. [2008]; Flanagan and Qadeer [2003] use a type
system to find movers in Java programs. The calvin tool [Flanagan et al. 2005, 2002; Freund and
Qadeer 2004] applies movers to establish pre/post conditions of functions in concurrent programs
using sequential verifiers. Similarly, qed [Elmas et al. 2009] rewrites concurrent code into sequential
code based on movers. These approaches are similar to ours in spirit: they take the verification
task to a much simpler semantics. However, movers are not a key aspect of our approach. We
employ them only to increase the applicability of our tool in case of benign pointer races. Elmas
et al. [2010] extend qed to establish linearizability for simple lock-free data structures. qed is
superseded by civl [Hawblitzel et al. 2015; Kragl and Qadeer 2018]. civl proves programs correct
by repeatedly applying movers to a program until its specification is obtained. The approach is
semi-automatic, it takes as input a so-called layered program that contains intermediary steps
guiding the transformation [Kragl and Qadeer 2018]. Movers were also applied in the context of
relaxed memory [Bouajjani et al. 2018].
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A EXAMPLE FOR HAZARD POINTERS
We give a brief example on how our type system infers that a pointer can be accessed safely, i.e., how
guarantee S is obtained, when hazard pointers are used. Figure 12 depicts a common usage pattern
and its typing. HP is specified by the SMR automaton OBase × OHP . For OHP and the HP-specific
guarantees consider Figure 13. We use two HP-specific guarantees Einv and Eisu that encode the
fact that protect for the 0-indexed hazard pointer has been invoked and returned, respectively.
121 // ...
122 { ptr: }
123 enter protect(ptr , 0);
124 { ptr:Einv }
125 exit protect;
126 { ptr:Eisu }
127 // ...
128 { ptr:Eisu }
129 @inv active(ptr)
130 { ptr:Eisu ∧ A }
131 { ptr:Eisu ∧ A ∧ S }
132 // ...
Fig. 12. A typing example for a typical
usage pattern of hazard pointers.
In the beginning, the type of ptr is . There are no
guarantees. Next, protect is invoked with ptr as a pa-
rameter. Using Rule (enter) we obtain type Einv for ptr,
stating that we have definitely invoked protect for ptr.
We already discussed in Section 6.3 how this is com-
puted. After protect returns, ptr obtains type Eisu from
an application of Rule (exit). It encodes the fact that
a protection has been issued. Accessing ptr, however,
is not safe at this point since we do not know whether
ptr has been retired in the meantime. To ensure that
the protection has been successful, the subsequent code
contains an active annotation. It adds A to the type of
ptr, Rule (active). An application of Rule (infer) al-
lows us to infer S for ptr. The type system successfully
discovered that it is safe to access ptr.
B MISSING DETAILS
B.1 Definitions
Definition B.1. The liberal semantics is defined by the following rules, assuming τ ∈ ⟦P⟧YX and
that act respects the control flow of P .
(Assign1) If act = (t , p.next := q, [a.next 7→ b]) then mτ (p) = a and mτ (q) = b.
(Assign2) If act = (t , p := q, [p 7→ mτ (q)]).
(Assign3) If act = (t , p := q.next, [p 7→ mτ (a.next)]) with mτ (q) = a ∈ Adr .
(Assign4) If act = (t , u := op(u′1, . . . , u′n), [u 7→ d]) with d = op(mτ (u′1), . . . , mτ (u′n)).
(Assign5) If act = (t , p.data := u′, [a.data 7→ mτ (u′)]) with mτ (p) = a ∈ Adr .
(Assign6) If act = (t , u := q.data, [u 7→ mτ (a.data)]) with mτ (q) = a ∈ Adr .
(Assume) If act = (t , assume lhs ≜ rhs,) then mτ (lhs) ≜ mτ (rhs).
(Malloc) If act = (t , p := malloc, up), then up has the form p 7→ a,a.next 7→ seg,a.data 7→ d so
that a ∈ fresh(τ ) or a ∈ freed(τ ) ∩ Y .
(Atomic) If act = (t , beginAtomic,) or act = (t , endAtomic,).
(Free) If act = (⊥, free(a),) then a ∈ X .
(Enter) act = (t , enter func(p¯, u¯),), then mτ (p) , seg for every p in p¯.
(Exit) act = (t , exit func,).
(Invariant1) act = (t , @inv angel r,).
(Invariant2) act = (t , @inv p in r,).
(Invariant3) act = (t , @inv active(p),).
(Invariant4) act = (t , @inv p = q,).
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OHP
L9 L10 L11 L12
L13 L14L15
L16 L17
L18 L19 L20
L21 L22 L23
L24 L25
L26
P1
E0
E1
P0
E1
E0
P0 E0 R F
P1
P1
E1 E1
R
R
F
F
!P0
!P0
!P0
!P0
!P1 !P1
P1
E1 R
R
R
P0 P0
E0
E0
F
F
F
!P1 !P1
!P0
!P0!P1
!P1
∈ Loc(Einv) ∈ Loc(Eisu)
P0 := enter protect(t ,a, 0), t = zt ∧ a = za P1 := enter protect(t ,a, 1), t = zt ∧ a = za
!P0 := enter protect(t ,a, 0), t = zt ∧ a , za !P1 := enter protect(t ,a, 1), t = zt ∧ a , za
E0 := exit protect(t), t = zt E1 := exit protect(t), t = zt
R := enter retire(t ,a), a = za F := free(a), a = za
Fig. 13. The SMR automaton OHP specifies the Hazard Pointer method for two hazard pointers per thread.
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Definition B.2. The history induced by a computation τ , denotedH(τ ), is defined by:
H(ϵ) = ϵ
H(τ .(t , free(a), up, pc)) =H(τ ). free(a)
H(τ .(t , enter func(p¯, u¯), up, pc)) =H(τ ). func(t , mτ (p¯), mτ (u¯))
H(τ .(t , exit func, up, pc)) =H(τ ). exit func(t)
H(τ .act) =H(τ ) otherwise.
Definition B.3. The fresh addresses in a computation τ , denoted by fresh(τ ), are defined by:
fresh(ϵ) = Adr
fresh(τ .act) = fresh(τ ) \ {a} if com(act) ≡ free(a)
fresh(τ .act) = fresh(τ ) \ {a} if com(act) ≡ p := malloc ∧ mτ .act(p) = a
fresh(τ .act) = fresh(τ ) otherwise.
The definition carries over naturally to histories.
Definition B.4. The freed addresses in a computation τ , denoted by freed(τ ), are defined by:
freed(ϵ) = 
freed(τ .act) = freed(τ ) ∪ {a} if com(act) ≡ free(a)
freed(τ .act) = freed(τ ) \ {a} if com(act) ≡ p := malloc ∧ mτ .act(p) = a
freed(τ .act) = freed(τ ) otherwise.
Definition B.5. The retired addresses in a computation τ , denoted by retired(τ ), are defined by:
retired(ϵ) = 
retired(τ .act) = retired(τ ) ∪ {a} if com(act) ≡ enter retire(p) ∧ a = mτ (p)
retired(τ .act) = retired(τ ) \ {a} if com(act) ≡ free(a)
retired(τ .act) = retired(τ ) otherwise.
Definition B.6. The active addresses in a computations τ are:
active(τ ) := Adr \ (freed(τ ) ∪ retired(τ )) .
Definition B.7 (Angel Denotation). Consider some τ ∈ ⟦P⟧AdrAdr . Let inv(τ ) have the prenex normal
form ∃r1 . . . ∃rn .ϕ, where ϕ is quantifier-free. Let rn be the instance of angel r resulting from the
last allocation in τ . The set of addresses possibly represented by angel r after computation τ is
reprτ (r) := {a ∈ Adr | ∃A1, . . . ,An ⊆ Adr .a ∈ An ∧ (A1, . . . ,An) |= ϕ} .
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Definition B.8 (Valid Expressions). The valid pointer expressions in a computation τ ∈ O⟦P⟧AdrAdr ,
denoted by validτ ⊆ PExp, are defined by:
validϵ := PVar
validτ .(t,p:=q,up) := validτ ∪ {p} if q ∈ validτ
validτ .(t,p:=q,up) := validτ \ {p} if q < validτ
validτ .(t,p.next:=q,up) := validτ ∪ {a.next} if mτ (p) = a ∈ Adr ∧ q ∈ validτ
validτ .(t,p.next:=q,up) := validτ \ {a.next} if mτ (p) = a ∈ Adr ∧ q < validτ
validτ .(t,p:=q.next,up) := validτ ∪ {p} if mτ (q) = a ∈ Adr ∧ a.next ∈ validτ
validτ .(t,p:=q.next,up) := validτ \ {p} if mτ (q) = a ∈ Adr ∧ a.next < validτ
validτ .(t,free(a),up) := validτ \ invalida
validτ .(t,p:=malloc,up) := validτ ∪ {p,a.next} if [p 7→ a] ∈ up
validτ .(t,assume p=q,up) := validτ ∪ {p, q} if {p, q} ∩ validτ , 
validτ .(t,act,up) := validτ otherwise.
We have invalida := {p | mτ (p) = a} ∪ {b .next | mτ (b .next) = a} ∪ {a.next}.
Definition B.9 (Observer Behavior). The behavior allowed by O on address a after history h,
denoted by FO(h, a), is the set FO(h, a) := {h′ | h.h′ ∈ S(O) ∧ frees(h′) ⊆ a}. If clear from the
context, we just write F(h, a).
Definition B.10 (Unsafe Access). A computation τ .act raises an unsafe access if com(act) contains
p.data or p.next with p < validτ .
Definition B.11 (Unsafe Assumption). A computation τ .act raises an unsafe assumption if com(act)
is of the form assume p = q with {p, q} ⊈ validτ .
Definition B.12 (Unsafe Retire). A computation τ .act raises an unsafe retire if com(act) is of the
form enter retire(p) with p < validτ .
Definition B.13 (Pointer Race). A computation τ .act raises a pointer race (PR) if it raises (i) an
unsafe access, (ii) an unsafe assumption, (iii) an unsafe call, or (iv) an unsafe retire. It is pointer race
free (PRF) if none of its prefixes raises a PR.
Definition B.14 (Renaming). A renaming of address a and b in a history h, denoted by h[a/b],
replaces in h every occurrence of a with b, and vice versa, as follows:
ϵ[a/b] = ϵ(
h.func(c¯, d¯))[a/b] = (h[a/b]) . (func(c¯[a/b], d¯))(
h.free(c))[a/b] = (h[a/b]) . (free(c[a/b]))
h.evt[a/b] = h[a/b].evt otherwise.
where a[a/b] = b, b[a/b] = a, and c[a/b] = c for all a , c , b.
Definition B.15 (Elision Support). Observer O supports elision of memory reuse if
(i) FO(h.free(a), b) = FO(h, b) for all h,a,b with a , b and h.free(a) ∈ S(O),
(ii) FO(h, c) = FO(h[a/b], c) for all h,a,b, c with a , c , b,
(iii) FO(h, a) ⊆ FO(h[a/b], a) for all h,a,b with a < retired(h) and b ∈ fresh(h), and
(iv) FO(h.free(a), a) ⊆ FO(h, a) for all h,a.
Definition B.16. The domain of a type environment Γ is defined by dom(Γ) = {x | ∃T . x :T ∈ Γ}.
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Definition B.17. Consider some Γ and p¯ = p1, . . . , pn with Γ(pi ) = Ti . Then we define:
safeEnter(Γ, func(p¯, u¯)) = true
iff ∀h ∀a¯, b¯, c, d¯ . (∀i . (ai = c ∨ isValid(Ti )) =⇒ ai = bi )
∧ FO(h.func(t , b¯, d¯), c) ⊈ FO(h.func(t , a¯, d¯), c) .
Definition B.18 (Post Image). The post image for pointers p and angles r is defined by:
postp,com(L) :={l′ | ∃ l ∃φ ∃m. (l,φ)−−−−−−→m(comt ) (l′,φ) ∧ l ∈ L ∧ φ(zt ) = t ∧ φ(za) = m(p)}
postr,com(L) :={l′ | ∃ l ∃φ ∃m. (l,φ)−−−−−−→m(comt ) (l′,φ) ∧ l ∈ L ∧ φ(zt ) = t}
where m(comt ) means the event that results from thread t executing com under memory m.
Definition B.19 (Relaxed Unsafe Assumption). A computation τ .act raises a relaxed unsafe as-
sumption if com(act) is assume p = q such that there is x, y ∈ {p, q} with p . y and x < validτ and
free(mτ (y)) ∈ H(τ ).
Definition B.20 (Relaxed Pointer Race). A computation τ .act is a relaxed pointer race (RPR) if act
is (i) an unsafe access, (ii) a relaxed unsafe assumption, (iii) an unsafe call, or (iv) an unsafe retire.
Theorem B.21 (Generalization of Theorem 4.1). If O supports elision and the semantics
O⟦P⟧Adr is relaxed-pointer-race-free, then O⟦P⟧AdrAdr ≺ ⟦P⟧.
Remark 1 (Theorem B.21). In practice, programs use a null constant. Since null is not part of
our command language, a program needs to define it itself. Ensuring that null is never written to nor
retired can be done easily, using a syntactic checks and assertions, respectively. Then, according to
Theorem 4.1, any pointer may be compared to null without risking a (relaxed) pointer race. This can
increase the applicability of the type system and ease the implementation of tools.
B.2 Reduction
Definition B.22. We write m(e) = ⊥ if e < dom(m).
Definition B.23 (In-Use Addresses). An address a is in-use in memory m if m contains a pointer
to a. Formally, the addresses in-use are adr(m) := (range(m) ∪ dom(m)) ∩ Adr where we use
{a.next} ∩ Adr = a and likewise for data selectors.
Definition B.24 (Restrictions). A restriction of m to a set P ⊆ PExp, denoted by m|P , is a new m′
with dom(m′) := P ∪ DVar ∪ {a.data ∈ DExp | a ∈ m(P)} and m(e) = m′(e) for all e ∈ dom(m′).
Definition B.25 (Computation similarity). Two computations τ and σ are similar, denoted by
τ ∼ σ , if ctrl(τ ) = ctrl(σ ) and mτ |validτ = mσ |validσ .
Definition B.26 (Observer Behavior Inclusion). Consider τ ,σ ∈ O⟦P⟧AdrAdr . Then, σ includes the
(observer) behavior of τ , denoted by τ ⋖σ , if FO(τ , a) ⊆ FO(σ , a) holds for all a ∈ adr(mτ |validτ ).
Definition B.27 (Computation Relation). Two computations are in computation relation, denoted
τ ≺ σ , if ctrl(τ ) = ctrl(σ ) and mτ |validτ = mσ |validτ .
Lemma B.28. ⟦P⟧YX is prefix closed by Assumption 1.
Lemma B.29. Consider τ ∈ ⟦P⟧AdrAdr . Then, adr(mτ |validτ ) = (validτ ∩ Adr) ∪ mτ (validτ ).
Lemma B.30. Consider τ ,σ ∈ O⟦P⟧AdrAdr . If τ ∼ σ , then validτ = validσ .
Lemma B.31. Let evt = func(t , a¯, d¯). Then, h1 ∈ FO(h2.evt, a) iff evt.h1 ∈ FO(h2, a).
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Lemma B.32. Consider τ ∈ ⟦P⟧Adr PRF. Then, adr(mτ |validτ ) ∩ mτ (PExp \ validτ ) = .
Lemma B.33. If τ ∈ ⟦P⟧AdrAdr and mτ (pexp) ∈ freed(τ ), then pexp < validτ .
Lemma B.34. Let τ ∈ O⟦P⟧AdrAdr , a ∈ (fresh(τ )∪ freed(τ ))\retired(τ ), and b ∈ fresh(τ ). If O supports
elision, then FO(τ , a) ⊆ FO(τ , b)[b/a].
Lemma B.35. Assume O supports elision. Let τ ∈ O⟦P⟧Adr , a < adr(mτ |validτ ), and A ⊆ Adr with
|A | < ∞. Then there is σ ∈ O⟦P⟧Adr and b ∈ fresh(τ ) \A with:• τ ∼ σ and τ ⋖σ and retired(τ ) ⊆ retired(σ ) ∪ {a} and a ∈ fresh(σ ),
• b ∈ fresh(σ ) ⇐⇒ a ∈ fresh(τ ) and fresh(σ ) \ {a,b} = fresh(τ ) \ {a,b},
• FO(τ , a) = FO(σ , b)[b/a] and FO(τ , b)[b/a] = FO(σ , a),
• ∀c . a , c , b =⇒ FO(τ , c) = FO(σ , c), and
• ∀e, e′ ∈ PVar ∪ {c .next | c ∈ mτ (validτ )}. mτ (e) , mτ (e′) =⇒ mσ (e) , mσ (e′).
Lemma B.36. Assume that O supports elision and that O⟦P⟧Adr is PRF. Then, for every τ ∈ O⟦P⟧AdrAdr
there is some σ ∈ O⟦P⟧Adr with τ ∼ σ , τ ⋖σ , and retired(τ ) ⊆ retired(σ ). Moreover, mτ (e) , mτ (e′)
implies mσ (e) , mσ (e′) for all e, e′ ∈ PVar ∪ {b .next | b ∈ mτ (validτ )}.
Lemma B.37. If τ ∈ ⟦P⟧AdrAdr and a ∈ fresh(τ ), then a < range(mτ ).
Lemma B.38. If τ ∈ ⟦P⟧AdrAdr , then fresh(τ ) ∩ retired(τ ) = .
Lemma B.39. If τ ∈ ⟦P⟧Adr PRF and pexp ∈ PExp with pexp < validτ , then mτ (pexp) ∈ freed(τ )
or pexp ≡ a.next ∧ a ∈ fresh(τ ) ∪ freed(τ ).
Lemma B.40. If τ ∈ ⟦P⟧Adr PRF and p ∈ PVar with p < validτ , then mτ (p) ∈ freed(τ ).
Lemma B.41. Assume O supports elision. Consider τ .act ∈ O⟦P⟧AdrAdr with com(act) = free(a). LetH(τ ) = h. Then, S(h.free(a)) ⊆ S(h).
Lemma B.42. Consider some τ ∈ O⟦P⟧Adr and some a ∈ Adr . Let φ = {za 7→ a}. Then:
(L2,φ)−−−→H(τ ) (L3,φ) ⇐⇒ a ∈ retired(τ )
(L2,φ)−−−→H(τ ) (L2,φ) ⇐⇒ a < retired(τ )
a ∈ active(τ ) =⇒ (L2,φ)−−−→H(τ ) (L2,φ)
Lemma B.43. Let τ .(t , free(a), up) ∈ O⟦P⟧Adr . If O = OBase × OImpl , then a ∈ retired(τ ).
Lemma B.44. Assume O supports elision. Then, for every τ ∈ O⟦P⟧Adr there is σ ∈ ⟦P⟧ with:
(i) ctrl(τ ) = ctrl(σ ), (ii) mτ = mσ , and (iii) fresh(τ ) ⊆ fresh(σ ). Moreover, if O = OBase × OImpl , then
(iv) retired(τ ) ⊆ retired(σ ), (v) freed(τ ) ⊆ retired(σ ), and (vi) inv(σ ) =⇒ inv(τ ).
Theorem B.45 (Formalization of Theorem 4.1). If O supports elision and the semantics O⟦P⟧Adr
is pointer-race-free, then O⟦P⟧AdrAdr ≺ ⟦P⟧.
B.3 Type System
In this section we assume, if not stated otherwise, a fixed program P and a fixed SMR automaton O
to avoid notational clutter. A generalization to arbitrary programs is straight forward. Recall from
Section 3 that we assume that O is of the form O = OBase × OImpl for some SMR automaton OImpl .
Definition B.46 (skip). We use the skip as syntactic sugar for a command that has no effect, for
example, assume u = u where u is some data variable. We assume that ⊢ { Γ } skip { Γ } holds for
all Γ.
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(sos1)
act = (t , com, up)
(com,τ ) dt (skip,τ .act)
(sos2)
(skip; stmt,τ ) dt (stmt,τ )
(sos3)
i ∈ {1, 2}
(stmt1 ⊕ stmt2,τ ) dt (stmti ,τ )
(sos4)
stmt1 . skip (stmt1,τ ) dt (stmt ′1,τ ′)
(stmt1; stmt2,τ ) dt (stmt ′1; stmt2,τ ′)
(sos5)
stmt ′ ∈ {skip, stmt, stmt; stmt∗}
(stmt∗,τ ) dt (stmt ′,τ )
(sos6)
pc(t) = stmt (stmt,τ ) dt (stmt ′,τ ′) lock(τ ) = {t}
(pc,τ ) dt (pc[t 7→ stmt ′],τ ′)
(sos7)
pc(t) = stmt (stmt,τ ) dt (stmt ′,τ ) lock(τ ) = 
(pc,τ ) dt (pc[t 7→ stmt ′],τ )
(sos8)
pc(t) = stmt (stmt,τ ) dt (stmt ′,τ .τ ′) lock(τ ) =  lock(τ .τ ′) = {t}
(pc,τ ) dt (pc[t 7→ stmt ′],τ .τ ′)
(sos9)
act = (⊥, free(a),) lock(τ ) = 
(pc,τ ) d⊥ (pc,τ .act)
lock(ϵ) := 
lock(τ .act) := lock(τ ) ∪ {t} if act = (t , beginAtomic, up)
lock(τ .act) := lock(τ ) \ {t} if act = (t , endAtomic, up)
lock(τ .act) := lock(τ ) otherwise
Fig. 14. The SOS rules for the transition relationd among configurations.
Definition B.47. Indexing a (pointer/angel/data) variable var by a thread t yields a new vari-
able vart . Indexing all non-shared variables var < shared by t in P gives a new program P [t ].
Definition B.48. The thread-local variables of t is the set localt = {pt | p < shared} of non-shared
variables indexed by t .
Definition B.49. The initial program counter is pcinit with pcinit(t) = P [t ] for all threads t .
Assumption 2. We assume that ghost variables r are local, that is, r < shared.
Definition B.50. The initial type environment for P is Γinit . For P [t ] it is Γ[t ]init . Formally:
Γinit := {x : | x ∈ PVar ∪ AVar}
Γ[t ]init := {p : | p ∈ PVar ∩ shared} ∪ {pt : | p ∈ PVar \ shared} ∪ {rt : | r ∈ AVar}
Definition B.51. We define ctrl(τ ) = {pc | (pcinit , ϵ) d∗ (pc,τ )} where d is the transition
relation among configurations from Figure 14. Then, ctrlt (τ ) = {pc(t) | pc ∈ ctrl(τ )}.
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Assumption 3. We assume that computations adhere to the control flow. Formally, this means
ctrl(τ ) ,  for all τ ∈ ⟦P⟧AdrAdr .
Remark 2. Assumption 3 requires that all primitive commands are wrapped inside atomics, that is,
occur somewhere between beginAtomic and endAtomic.
Definition B.52. A computation τ ∈ ⟦P⟧AdrAdr induces a flat line program for thread t , denoted by
flatt (τ ), as follows:
flatt (ϵ) := skip
flatt (τ .act) := flatt (τ ); com if act = (t , com, up)
flatt (τ .act) := flatt (τ ) if act = (t ′, com, up) ∧ t , t ′
Definition B.53. A pointer p has no valid alias in a computation τ , denoted by noaliasτ (p), if
seg , mτ (p) < mτ (validτ \ {p}).
Definition B.54. Consider some τ ∈ ⟦P⟧AdrAdr . Let inv(τ ) have the prenex normal form ∃r1 . . . ∃rn .ϕ,
where ϕ is quantifier-free. Let rn be the instance of angel r resulting from the last allocation in τ .
The set of addresses possibly represented by angel r after computation τ is
reprτ (r) := {a ∈ Adr | ∃A1, . . . ,An ⊆ Adr . a ∈ An ∧ (A1, . . . ,An) |= ϕ} .
Definition B.55. The locations reached in O by a history h wrt. to some thread t and some address
a is defined by reachO,t,a(h) := {l | ∃φ. (linit ,φ)−→h (l,φ) ∧ φ(zt ) = t ∧ φ(za) = a} where linit is
the initial location in O. For seg we define reachO,t,a(h) = ⊤ to contain all locations of O. The
definition of reach extends naturally to sets of histories.
Lemma B.56. If Γ1 ; Γ2 and Γ2 ; Γ3, then Γ1 ; Γ3.
Lemma B.57. Consider ⊢ { Γ1 } stmt { Γ2 } and (stmt,τ ) dt (stmt ′,τ .τ ′). Then there is Γ such that
⊢ { Γ1 } flatt (τ ′) { Γ } and ⊢ { Γ } stmt ′ { Γ2 }.
Lemma B.58. Let ⊢ { Γinit } P { Γ }. Consider (pcinit , ϵ) d∗ (pc,τ ) and some thread t . Then there is
Γ1, Γ2 with ⊢ { Γ[t ]init } flatt (τ ) { Γ1 } and ⊢ { Γ1 } pc(t) { Γ2 }.
Lemma B.59. Let τ .act ∈ ⟦P⟧Adr and t , thrd(act). Let ⊢ { Γ[t ]init }flatt (τ ) { Γ } and x ∈ PVar∪AVar .
Then A < Γ(x) and x < localt =⇒ Γ(x) ∩ {L,S} = .
Lemma B.60. Let τ .act ∈ ⟦P⟧Adr and t , thrd(act) , ⊥. Let p ∈ PVar ∩ localt . Then, p ∈ validτ
implies p ∈ validτ .act . Moreover, noaliasτ (p) implies noaliasτ .act(p).
Lemma B.61. Consider τ .act ∈ ⟦P⟧Adr PRF with act = (t , @inv p = q, up) and inv(τ .act). Then,{p, q} ∩ validτ ,  implies {p, q} ⊆ validτ .
Lemma B.62. Consider τ .act ∈ O⟦P⟧Adr PRF with act = (t , @inv active(p), up) and inv(τ .act).
Then, p ∈ validτ .act and reachO,t,a(H(τ .act)) ⊆ Loc(A) for a = mτ .act(p).
Lemma B.63. Consider τ .act ∈ O⟦P⟧Adr PRF with act = (t , @inv active(r), up) and inv(τ .act).
Then, reprτ .act(r) ∩ freed(τ .act) =  and reachO,t,a(H(τ .act)) ⊆ Loc(A) for all a ∈ reprτ .act(r).
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Lemma B.64. Let τ ∈ O⟦P⟧Adr . Let Γ, Γ′ such that Γ ; Γ′. Let t be some thread. Let p ∈ PVar and
a = mτ (p). Let r ∈ AVar and b ∈ reprτ (r). Then,
isValid(Γ(p)) =⇒ p ∈ validτ implies isValid(Γ′(p)) =⇒ p ∈ validτ
isValid(Γ(r)) =⇒ b < freed(τ ) implies isValid(Γ′(r)) =⇒ b < freed(τ )
L ∈ Γ(p) =⇒ noaliasτ (p) implies L ∈ Γ′(p) =⇒ noaliasτ (p)
reachO,t,a(H(τ )) ⊆ Loc(Γ(p)) implies reachO,t,a(H(τ )) ⊆ Loc(Γ′(p))
reachO,t,b (H(τ )) ⊆ Loc(Γ(r)) implies reachO,t,b (H(τ )) ⊆ Loc(Γ′(r))
Lemma B.65. Assume O supports elision, and inv(⟦P⟧). Consider some thread t , some type en-
vironments Γ, and some τ ∈ O⟦P⟧Adr PRF with inv(τ ) and ⊢ { Γ[t ]init } flatt (τ ) { Γ }. Then, for every
p ∈ PVar , we have reachO,t,a(H(τ )) ⊆ Loc(Γ(p)) and isValid(Γ(p)) =⇒ p ∈ validτ .
Lemma B.66. Let O supports elision. If ⊢P and inv(⟦P⟧), then O⟦P⟧Adr PRF and inv(O⟦P⟧Adr ).
Lemma B.67. Let O supports elision. If ⊢P and inv(⟦P⟧), ⟦P⟧AdrAdr does not perform double retires.
C PROOFS
C.1 Reduction
Proof of Lemma B.28. Follows immediately from Assumption 1 as it guarantees that continua-
tions of a history not accepted by O are also not accepted. □
Proof of Lemma B.29. Follows from [Meyer and Wolff 2018, Lemma D.5]. □
Proof of Lemma B.30. Follows from [Meyer and Wolff 2018, Lemma D.7] □
Proof of Lemma B.31. Follows from definition. □
Proof of Lemma B.32. Follows from [Meyer and Wolff 2018, Lemma D.15]. That the semantics
from [Meyer and Wolff 2018] sets selectors to ⊥ for free commands does not affect the result. □
Proof of Lemma B.33. To the contrary, assume there is a shortest τ .act ∈ ⟦P⟧AdrAdr with some
address a ∈ freed(τ .act) and a ∈ mτ .act(validτ .act). Note that τ .act is indeed the shortest such
computation since the claim is vacuously true for ϵ .
First, consider the case where we have a < freed(τ ). Then, act must execute the command free(a).
As a consequence, we get pexp < validτ .act for all pexp with mτ (pexp) = a. So a < mτ .act(validτ .act).
Since this contradicts the assumption, we must have a ∈ freed(τ ).
Now, consider the case where we have a ∈ freed(τ ). By definition, there is some pexp ∈ validτ .act
with mτ .act(pexp) = a , seg. We get pexp < validτ by minimality of τ .act. That is, act validates
pexp. To do so, act must be an assignment, an allocation, or an assertion:
• If act is of the form act = (t , pexp := qexp, up), then qexp ∈ validτ and mτ (qexp) = a
must hold in order to establish the desired properties of pexp. However, mτ (qexp) leads to
qexp < validτ by minimality of τ .act. Hence, act cannot be an assignment.
• If act is of the form act = (t , pexp := malloc, up), then a < freed(τ .act) by definition. Hence,
act cannot be an allocation targeting pexp.
• If act is of the form act = (t , p := malloc, up) with mτ .act(p) = b and pexp ≡ b .next, then
mτ .act(pexp) = seg¬a. Hence, act cannot be an allocation.
• If act is of the form act = (t , assume p = q, up), then wlog. pexp ≡ p and q ∈ validτ and
a = mτ .act(pexp) = mτ (pexp) = mτ (q) must hold. Again by minimality, we get q < validτ
which contradicts the assumption. Hence, act cannot be an assertion.
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The above case distinction is complete and thus concludes the claim. □
Proof of Lemma B.34. Let τ ∈ O⟦P⟧AdrAdr , a ∈ (fresh(τ ) ∪ freed(τ )) \ retired(τ ), and b ∈ fresh(τ ).
Let H(τ ) = h. We have FO(h, b)[b/a] = FO(h[b/a], a) according to [Meyer and Wolff 2018,
Lemma D.26]. If a ∈ freed(τ ), then Definition B.15iii yields FO(h, a) ⊆ FO(h[b/a], a). Thus,
FO(h, a) ⊆ FO(h, b)[b/a] as desired. Otherwise, we have a ∈ fresh(τ ). This means h[b/a] = h. So,
FO(h[b/a], a) = FO(h, a). Hence, FO(h, a) = FO(h, b)[b/a] as desired. □
Proof of Lemma B.35. Follows from [Meyer and Wolff 2018, Lemmas D.26, D.27 and D.28]. That
the semantics from [Meyer and Wolff 2018] sets selectors to ⊥ for free commands does not affect
the result. □
Proof of Lemma B.36. Follows from [Meyer and Wolff 2018, Proofs of Proposition C.14, Lemma
C.16, and Lemma D.16]. □
Proof of Lemma B.37. Follows from [Meyer and Wolff 2018, Lemma D.9]. □
Proof of Lemma B.38. The claim holds for the empty computation ϵ . To the contrary, assume
the claim does not hold. Then, there must be a shortest computation τ .act ∈ ⟦P⟧AdrAdr such that
fresh(τ .act) ∩ retired(τ .act) , . Let a ∈ fresh(τ .act) ∩ retired(τ .act). By minimality of τ .act, we
must have a < fresh(τ ) or a < retired(τ ). If a < fresh(τ ), then we have a < fresh(τ .act) by definition.
Since this contradicts the assumption, we must have a ∈ fresh(τ ) and a < retired(τ ). To arrive at
a ∈ retired(τ .act), act must be of the form act = (t , enter retire(p), up) with mτ (p) = a. By the
contrapositive of Lemma B.37, we have a < fresh(τ ). As before, this gives a < fresh(τ .act) and
contradicts the assumption. □
Proof of Lemma B.39. The claim holds for the empty computation ϵ by definition. Consider
some τ .act ∈ ⟦P⟧Adr PRF with act = (t , com, up) such that for every qexp ∈ PExp we have
qexp < validτ implies mτ (qexp) ∈ freed(τ ) or qexp < PVar ∧ {qexp} ∩ Adr ⊆ fresh(τ ) ∪ freed(τ ).
Let pexp ∈ PExp be some pointer expression with pexp < validτ .act . We do a case distinction.
• Consider com being an assignment. If com does not contain pexp at the left-hand side, then
pexp < validτ . Hence, we have either mτ .act(pexp) = mτ (pexp) ∈ freed(τ ) = freed(τ .act) or
pexp < PVar ∧ {pexp} ∩ Adr ⊆ fresh(τ ) ∪ freed(τ ) = fresh(τ .act) = freed(τ .act). Otherwise,
com ≡ pexp := qexp. If qexp ∈ PVar , then qexp < validτ . Thus, mτ (qexp) ∈ freed(τ ). We get
mτ .act(pexp) ∈ freed(τ .act). Otherwise, qexp ≡ p.next with mτ (p) = a and a.next < validτ .
By Lemma B.37 we have a < fresh(τ ). So we get mτ (qexp) ∈ freed(τ ) or a ∈ freed(τ ). The
latter cannot apply since Lemma B.33 gives p < validτ which means τ .act raises a pointer
race contradicting the assumption. In the remaining case we get mτ .act(pexp) ∈ freed(τ .act)
as desired.
• Consider com being an assume, an @inv, an enter, or an exit. Then, we know that pexp <
validτ , mτ (pexp) = mτ .act(pexp), fresh(τ ) = fresh(τ .act), and freed(τ ) = freed(τ .act). This
implies the desired property.
• Consider com being an allocation. Let com ≡ p := malloc. The update is of the form up =
[p 7→ a,a.next 7→ seg,dots] for some a ∈ Adr . By the semantics, we have a ∈ fresh(τ ). We
get fresh(τ .act) = fresh(τ ) \ {a} and freed(τ .act) = freed(τ ) \ {a}. Since pexp < validτ .act ,
we have pexp < {p,a.next}. So mτ (pexp) = mτ .act(pexp). If mτ (pexp) ∈ freed(τ ) we get
mτ (pexp) < fresh(τ ) and thus mτ .act(pexp) ∈ freed(τ .act). Otherwise, pexp ≡ b .next and
b ∈ fresh(τ ) ∪ freed(τ ) with a , b. So we get the desired b ∈ fresh(τ .act) ∪ freed(τ .act).
• Consider com being a free. Let com ≡ free(a). If pexp ∈ validτ , then we have mτ (pexp) = a
or pexp ≡ a.next since act invalidates pexp. We get either mτ .act(pexp) ∈ freed(τ .act) or
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pexp ≡ a.next ∧ a ∈ freed(τ .act). Otherwise, we have pexp < validτ . If mτ (pexp) ∈ freed(τ ),
then mτ .act(pexp) ∈ freed(τ .act). Otherwise, pexp ≡ b .next ∧ b ∈ fresh(τ ) ∪ freed(τ ). This
gives b ∈ fresh(τ .act) ∪ freed(τ .act) because a = b yields b ∈ freed(τ .act) and a , b does not
affect the freshness/freedness of b.
This concludes the claim. □
Proof of Lemma B.40. Follows from Lemma B.39. □
Proof of Lemma B.41. By assumption we have
∀h ∀a,b . a , b =⇒ FO(h.free(a), b) = FO(h, b) (A1)
∀h ∀a. FO(h.free(a), a) ⊆ FO(h, a) (A2)
Consider some h.free(a). We show S(h.free(a)) ⊆ S(h) as this implies the claim. Towards a
contradiction, assume the inclusion does not hold. That is, there is a shortest h′ ∈ S(h.free(a))
with h′ < S(h). If frees(h′) = , then we get h′ ∈ FO(h.free(a), a). By Auxiliary (A2) we have
h′ ∈ FO(h, a). This means h′ ∈ S(h) by definition. This contradicts the choice of h′. So we must
have frees(h′) , .
Consider now frees(h′) , . That is, there is a decomposition of h′ of the form h′ = h1.free(b).h2
with frees(h2) = . We derive the following.
• We have h1.free(b).h2 < S(h). That is, h.h1.free(b).h2 < S(O). By definition, this means
h2 < FO(h.h1.free(b), c) with c , b. Now, Auxiliary (A1) yields h2 < FO(h.h1, c). Since
frees(h2) = , we must have h.h1.h2 < S(O). That is, we get h1.h2 < S(h).
• We have h1.free(b).h2 ∈ S(h.free(a)). So, h.free(a).h1.free(b).h2 ∈ S(O). By frees(h2), we
get h2 ∈ FO(h.free(a).h1.free(b), b). Then, Auxiliary (A2) yields h2 ∈ FO(h.free(a).h1, b).
So, h.free(a).h1.h2 ∈ S(O). That is, we get h1.h2 ∈ S(h.free(a)).
Altogether, this means we have h1.h2 ∈ S(h.free(a)) and h1.h2 < S(h) with h1.h2 being shorter
than h1.free(b).h2. This contradicts the minimality of h′ and thus concludes the claim. □
Proof of Lemma B.42. Let a ∈ Adr and φ = {za 7→ a}. The claim holds for ϵ . Towards a
contradiction, assume there is a shortest τ .act ∈ O⟦P⟧Adr with (L2,φ)−−−−−−→H(τ .act) (L3,φ) and a <
retired(τ .act). If H(τ .act) = H(τ ), then we have retired(τ .act) = retired(τ ). This contradicts the
assumption that τ .act is the shortest such computation. SoH(τ .act) is of the formH(τ .act) = h.evt
with h = H(τ ). We do a case distinction on the state after τ .
• Consider (L2,φ)−→h (L1,φ). By definition of OBase , there is not step (L1,φ)−−→evt (L3,φ). Hence,
this case cannot apply.
• Consider (L2,φ)−→h (L2,φ). Then we must have (L2,φ)−−→evt (L3,φ). This means evt is of the form
evt = retire(t ,a) for some thread t . By definition, act = (t , retire(p),) with mτ (p) = a.
Thus, a ∈ retired(τ .act). This contradicts the assumption.
• Consider (L2,φ)−→h (L3,φ). Byminimality, we have a ∈ retired(τ ). To arrive at a < retired(τ ), we
must have evt = free(a). This, however, leads to (L3,φ)−−→evt (L2,φ). So, (L2,φ)−−−−−−→H(τ .act) (L2,φ).
This contradicts the assumption.
The above case distinction is complete and thus proves that (L2,φ)−−−→H(τ ) (L3,φ) implies a ∈ retired(τ ).
Consider now the reverse direction. To that end, consider some τ ∈ O⟦P⟧Adr and some a < retired(τ ).
Using the contrapositive of the above, we get (L2,φ)−−−→H(τ ) (l,φ) with l , L3. By Assumption 1, l , L1
as for otherwise τ < O⟦P⟧Adr . Hence, l = L2 must hold. This establishes the first equivalence.
The second equivalence follow analogously. The remaining property follows from the second
equivalence together with the fact that a ∈ active(τ ) implies a < retired(τ ). □
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Proof of Lemma B.43. Let τ .act ∈ O⟦P⟧Adr with act = (t , free(a), up). Let φ = {za 7→ a}. We
have H(τ .act) = h.free(a) with h = H(τ ). By definition, h.free(a) ∈ S(OBase). So we must have
(L2,φ)−→h (L3,φ) as for otherwise free(a)would take OBase to L2 and thus give τ .act < O⟦P⟧Adr . Now
Lemma B.42 yields the desired a ∈ retired(τ ). □
Proof of Lemma B.44. For τ = ϵ we choose ϵ = σ ∈ ⟦P⟧. Then, σ satisfies the desired
properties. Consider now τ .act ∈ O⟦P⟧Adr . Assume we already constructed σ ∈ ⟦P⟧ with:
(P1) ctrl(τ ) = ctrl(σ ),
(P2) mτ = mσ ,
(P3) fresh(τ ) ⊆ fresh(σ ),
(P4) retired(τ ) ⊆ retired(σ ), and
(P5) freed(τ ) ⊆ retired(σ ).
(P6) inv(σ ) =⇒ inv(τ ).
First, assume com(act) . free(a). We get σ .act ∈ ⟦P⟧. The reason for this is that σ :
• performs the same updates in assignments due to Property (P2),
• allows for the same assume commands due to Property (P2),
• emits the same events due to Property (P2),
• allows for the same malloc commands due to Property (P3), and
• nothing can be removed from retired(σ ).
Moreover, σ satisfies the desired properties. This is because the same update is applied after τ and
σ . To see that inv(σ .act) =⇒ inv(τ .act), let act execute an annotation. There are two cases:
• Consider com(act) is of the form @inv angel r . By definition, inv(τ .act) = ∃r . Fτ and
inv(σ .act) = ∃r . Fσ . By induction, we get inv(σ .act) =⇒ inv(τ .act).
• Consider com(act) . @inv angel r . By definition then, inv(τ .act) = inv(τ )∧Fτ and inv(σ .act) =
inv(σ )∧Fσ . If com(act) < {@inv active(p), @inv active(r)}, we have Fτ ≡ Fσ by Property (P2).
Otherwise, we have Fσ =⇒ Fτ because Properties (P4) and (P5) gives active(σ ) ⊆ active(τ ).
By induction, we get inv(σ .act) =⇒ inv(τ .act).
The case distinction is complete and thus concludes the claim.
If com(act) ≡ free(a), then σ already has the desired properties. This is the case because free(a)
does not affect the memory nor the control. The free(a) may remove a from fresh(τ ), thus main-
taining fresh(τ .act) ⊆ fresh(σ ). Similarly, we maintain retired(τ .act) ⊆ retired(σ ). Last, we have
freed(τ .act) = freed(τ ) ∪ {a}. It remains to show that a ∈ retired(σ ). This follows from Lemma B.43
together with retired(τ ) ⊆ retired(σ ) from induction. □
Proof of Theorem B.45. Follows from Lemmas B.36 and B.44. □
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Follows from Theorem B.45. □
Proof of Theorem B.21. Follows from Lemmas B.36 and B.44. Here, we rely on a generalization
of Lemma B.36 that assumes only RPRF in its premise. To prove the generalization of that lemma,
we have to consider one additional case, namely the case where τ .act ∈ O⟦P⟧AdrAdr is a PR but RPRF.
(During the proof, we have already constructed σ ∈ O⟦P⟧Adr with τ ∼ σ .) That is, act is of the
form assume p = q such that, without loss of generality, p < validτ and free(a) ∈ H(τ ) where
a = mτ (q). This means τ .act ∈ O⟦P⟧Adr\{a }Adr\{a } . So q ∈ validτ . By [Meyer and Wolff 2018, Lemma
D.15] we have mτ (p) , a = mτ (q). Hence, the case cannot apply. (The remaining cases are identical
to the non-generalized version, Lemma B.36). □
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C.2 Type System
Proof of Lemma B.56. Immediately follows from definition. □
Proof of Lemma B.57. We do an induction over the derivation depth of ⊢ { Γ1 } stmt { Γ2 }.
IB: The derivation is due to one rule application. This means the derivation is not due to one of:
(infer), (seq), (choice), or (loop). For the remaining, applicable rules we have stmt ≡ com
and (com,τ ) dt (skip,τ .τ ′). Thus, flatt (τ ′) = stmt. We immediately get ⊢ { Γ1 }flatt (τ ′) { Γ2 }.
Moreover, ⊢ { Γ2 } skip { Γ2 } holds by definition. That is, we choose Γ = Γ2 as it has the desired
properties.
IH: If ⊢ { Γ1 }stmt{ Γ2 } and (stmt,τ ) dt (stmt ′,τ .τ ′) hold, then there is some Γwith ⊢ { Γ1 }flatt (τ ′){ Γ }
and ⊢ { Γ } stmt ′ { Γ2 }.
IS: Consider a composed derivation of ⊢ { Γ1 } stmt { Γ2 }. Let (stmt,τ ) dt (stmt ′,τ .τ ′). We do a
case distinction on the first rule of the derivation.
Rule (seq), part 1. Consider stmt ≡ skip; stmt2. Then, stmt ′ = stmt2 and τ ′ = ϵ . Moreover,
there exists some Γ such that ⊢ { Γ1 } skip { Γ } and ⊢ { Γ } stmt2 { Γ2 } due to the type rules.
Note that flatt (τ ′) = skip. That is, Γ has the desired properties.
Rule (seq), part 2. Consider stmt ≡ stmt1; stmt2. Let (stmt1,τ ) dt (stmt ′1,τ .τ ′′). By definition,
stmt ′ = stmt ′1; stmt2 and τ ′ = τ ′′. The type rules give some Γ′ with ⊢ { Γ1 } stmt1 { Γ′ } and
⊢ { Γ′ } stmt2 { Γ2 }. By induction, there is Γ with ⊢ { Γ1 } flatt (τ ′) { Γ } and ⊢ { Γ } stmt ′1 { Γ′ }.
The latter gives ⊢ { Γ } stmt ′1; stmt2 { Γ2 }. That is, Γ has the desired properties.
Rule (choice). We have stmt ≡ stmt1 ⊕ stmt2. Then, τ ′ = ϵ and stmt ′ = stmti for some
i ∈ {1, 2}. Due to the type rules, we have ⊢ { Γ1 } stmti { Γ2 }. Moreover, flatt (τ ′) = skip
gives ⊢ { Γ1 } flatt (τ ′) { Γ1 }. That is, Γ = Γ1 is an adequate choice with the desired properties.
Rule (loop). We have stmt ≡ stmt∗1. Then, τ ′ = ϵ and stmt ′ = stmti for some i ∈ {1, 2}.
Due to the type rules, we have ⊢ { Γ1 } stmti { Γ2 }. Moreover, flatt (τ ′) = skip gives ⊢
{ Γ1 } flatt (τ ′) { Γ1 }. That is, Γ = Γ1 is an adequate choice with the desired properties.
Rule (infer). There are type environments Γ3 and Γ4 such that Γ1 ; Γ3, ⊢ { Γ3 } stmt { Γ4 }, and
Γ4 ; Γ2. By induction, there is Γ with ⊢ { Γ3 } flatt (τ ′) { Γ } and ⊢ { Γ } stmt ′ { Γ4 }. Applying
Rule (infer) we get ⊢ { Γ1 } flatt (τ ′) { Γ } and ⊢ { Γ } stmt ′ { Γ2 } as desired.
The above induction concludes the claim. □
Proof of Lemma B.58. Let ⊢ { Γinit } P { Γ }. We proceed by induction over the SOS transitions.
IB: We have (pcinit , ϵ) d0 (pc,τ ). That is, pc = pcinit and τ = ϵ . Consider some thread t . We have
flatt (τ ) = skip and pc(t) = P [t ]. The former gives ⊢ { Γ[t ]init } flatt (τ ) { Γ[t ]init }. The latter gives
⊢ { Γ[t ]init } pc(t) { Γ } due to the premise. So we can choose Γ1 = Γ[t ]init and Γ2 = Γ.
IH: Let the claim hold for sequences of up to n steps.
IS: Consider now (pcinit , ϵ) dn (pc,τ ) dt ′ (pc′,τ .τ ′). Let t , ⊥ be some arbitrary thread. By
induction, there are Γ′1 , Γ2 with
⊢ { Γ[t ]init } flatt (τ ) { Γ′1 } and ⊢ { Γ′1 } pc(t) { Γ2 } .
First, assume t , t ′. Then, flatt (τ .act) = flatt (τ ) and pc′(t) = pc(t). Thus, the claim follows
immediately by induction. So consider t = t ′ now. We have (pc(t),τ ) dt (pc′(t),τ .τ ′) by
definition. Lemma B.57 yields Γ1 with
⊢ { Γ′1 } flatt (τ ′) { Γ1 } and ⊢ { Γ1 } pc′(t) { Γ2 } .
Altogether, we get the desired:
⊢ { Γ[t ]init } flatt (τ .act) { Γ1 } and ⊢ { Γ1 } pc′(t) { Γ2 } .
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The above induction concludes the claim. □
Proof of Lemma B.59. Let τ .act ∈ ⟦P⟧Adr and t , t ′ threads with t , t ′ = thrd(act). Consider
some ⊢ { Γ[t ]init } flatt (τ ) { Γ } and x ∈ PVar ∪ AVar . We have lock(τ ) = {t ′} or lock(τ .act) = {t ′}.
Hence, t has not yet contributed any actions to τ or it has finished an atomic section. We do a case
distinction.
• Consider the case flatt (τ ) = skip. By the type rules there is Γ′ with:
Γ[t ]init ; Γ′ ⊢ { Γ′ } skip { Γ′ } Γ′ ; Γ
By definition, Γ[t ]init (x) = . So ¬isValid(Γ[t ]init (x)). Hence, ¬isValid(Γ′(x)) and ¬isValid(Γ(x))
follow from the definition of type inference. So we conclude Γ(x) ∩ {A,L,S} = .
• Consider the case flatt (τ .act) = stmt; endAtomic for some statement stmt. By the typing rules
there are Γ1, Γ2, Γ3 with:
⊢ { Γ[t ]init } stmt { Γ1 } Γ1 ; Γ2 ⊢ { Γ2 } endAtomic { Γ3 } Γ3 ; Γ
where the derivation ⊢ { Γ2 } endAtomic { Γ3 } is due to Rule (end). This means, Γ3 = rm(Γ2).
By definition, A < Γ3(x). Hence, type inference provides A < Γ(p) as desired.
Now, consider the case p < localt . There are two cases. First, assume p ∈ shared. Γ3(p) =  by
definition. Second, assume p < shared. That is, x is local to another thread t ′′ , t : p ∈ localt ′′ .
Then, the claim follows because the initial type binding does not contain local pointers of
other threads and the type rules never add type bindings.
The above case distinction is complete and concludes the claim thus. □
Proof of Lemmas B.60 and B.60. Let τ .act ∈ ⟦P⟧Adr and t , t ′ threads with t , t ′ = thrd(act) ,⊥. Let p ∈ PVar ∩ localt . By definition, localt ∩ localt ′ = . Due to the semantics, p does not occur
in com(act). Hence, p ∈ validτ ⇐⇒ p ∈ validτ .act . Moreover, mτ (p) = mτ .act(p). So every valid
alias created by act requires a valid alias in τ . This is not possible since noaliasτ (p). □
Proof of Lemma B.61. Let τ .act ∈ ⟦P⟧Adr PRF with act = (t , @inv p = q,) and inv(τ .act).
The latter gives mτ (p) = mτ (q). Towards a contradiction, assume the claim does not hold. Wlog.
p < validτ and q ∈ validτ . Lemma B.32 gives mτ (p) , mτ (q). This contradicts the premise and thus
concludes the claim. □
Proof of Lemma B.62. Let τ .act ∈ ⟦P⟧Adr PRF with act = (t , @inv active(p), up) and inv(τ .act).
By definition, this means mτ (p) ∈ active(τ ). That is, mτ (p) < freed(τ ). By the contrapositive of
Lemma B.40: p ∈ validτ . So p ∈ validτ .act by definition. Moreover, we get mτ .act(p) ∈ active(τ .act).
Hence, the remaining property follows from Lemma B.42. □
Proof of Lemma B.63. Let τ .act ∈ ⟦P⟧Adr PRF with act = (t , @inv active(r), up) and inv(τ .act).
By definition, we have reprτ (r) ⊆ active(τ ). Hence, reprτ (r) ∩ freed(τ .act) = . Moreover, we have
reprτ .act(r) ⊆ active(τ .act) by definition. Let a ∈ reprτ .act(r). This means a ∈ active(τ .act). Then,
the remaining property follows from Lemma B.42. □
Proof of Lemma B.64. Let τ ∈ O⟦P⟧Adr . Let Γ, Γ′ be two type environments with Γ ; Γ′. Let
p ∈ PVar be a pointer with a = mτ (p). Let r ∈ AVar a ghost variable and b ∈ reprτ (r). Consider the
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possible assumptions:
isValid(Γ(p)) =⇒ p ∈ validτ (1)
isValid(Γ(r)) =⇒ b < freed(τ ) (2)
L ∈ Γ(p) =⇒ noaliasτ (p) (3)
reachO,t,a(H(τ )) ⊆ Loc(Γ(p)) (4)
reachO,t,b (H(τ )) ⊆ Loc(Γ(r)) (5)
The definition of Γ ; Γ′ gives:
isValid(Γ′(p)) =⇒ isValid(Γ(p)) (6)
isValid(Γ′(r)) =⇒ isValid(Γ(r)) (7)
L ∈ Γ′(p) =⇒ L ∈ Γ(p) (8)
Loc(Γ(p)) ⊆ Loc(Γ′(p)) (9)
Loc(Γ(r)) ⊆ Loc(Γ′(r)) (10)
Then, we combine
• If (1) holds, then (6) gives isValid(Γ′(p)) =⇒ p ∈ validτ ,
• If (2) holds, then (7) gives isValid(Γ′(r)) =⇒ b < freed(τ ),
• If (3) holds, then (8) gives L ∈ Γ′(p) =⇒ noaliasτ (p), and
• If (4) holds, then (9) gives reachO,t,a(H(τ )) ⊆ Loc(Γ′(p)).
• If (5) holds, then (10) gives reachO,t,b (H(τ )) ⊆ Loc(Γ′(r)).
This concludes the claim. □
Proof of Lemma B.65. Let τ ∈ O⟦P⟧Adr . We show:
freed(τ ) ∩ retired(τ ) = 
and ∀t ∀Γ. ⊢ { Γ[t ]init } flatt (τ ) { Γ }
=⇒ ∀p, r .
©­­­­­­­«
reachO,t,mτ (p)(H(τ )) ⊆ Loc(Γ(p))
∧ isValid(Γ(p)) =⇒ p ∈ validτ
∧ L ∈ Γ(p) =⇒ noaliasτ (p)
∧ ∀a ∈ reprτ (r). reachO,t,a(H(τ )) ⊆ Loc(Γ(r))
∧ isValid(Γ(r)) =⇒ reprτ (r) ∩ freed(τ ) = 
ª®®®®®®®¬
We proceed by induction over the structure of τ .
IB: Letτ = ϵ . Let t be some thread and let Γ be some type environment such that ⊢ { Γ[t ]init }flatt (τ ){ Γ }.
Note that flatt (τ ) = skip. By definition, freed(τ ) ∩ retired(τ ) = . Consider some thread t ,
some p ∈ PVar and some r ∈ AVar . By definition, p ∈ validτ . This gives the desired implication
isValid(Γ(p)) =⇒ p ∈ validτ . By the type rules we have:
Γ[t ]init , ϵ ; Γ1 ⊢ { Γ1 } skip { Γ1 } Γ1, ϵ ; Γ
Since L < Γ[t ]init (p), we get L < Γ(p) by the definition of type inference. So we satisfy the
implication L ∈ Γ(p) =⇒ noaliasτ (p). Moreover, freed(τ ) = . So isValid(Γ(r)) =⇒
a < freed(τ ) is satisfied for every a ∈ Adr as well. By Lemma B.56 we have Γ[t ]init ; Γ.
That is, Loc(Γ[t ]init (p)) ⊆ Loc(Γ(p)). By definition, Γ[t ]init (p) = . That is, Loc(Γ[t ]init (p)) = ⊤ × ⊤.
Consequently, reachO,t,mτ (p)(H(τ )) ⊆ Loc(Γ[t ]init (p)). Similarly for r . Altogether, this concludes
the base case.
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IH: Let the claim hold for τ .
IS: Consider τ ′ = τ .act with act = (t ′, com, up), τ .act PRF, and inv(τ .act). Let t be some arbitrary
thread we establish the claim for. We do a case distinction on t ′.
Ad t = t ′ , ⊥. We have
flatt (τ .act) = flatt (τ ); com and freed(τ .act) ⊆ freed(τ ) .
Assume that τ .act can be typed for t as nothing needs to be shown otherwise. That is, assume
there are Γ3 such that
⊢ { Γ[t ]init } flatt (τ .act) { Γ3 } .
Due to the type rules and the above equality, we know that there are some Γ1, Γ2 such that:
⊢ { Γ[t ]init } flatt (τ ) { Γ0 } Γ0 ; Γ1 ⊢ { Γ1 } com { Γ2 } Γ2 ; Γ3
where ⊢ { Γ1 } com { Γ2 } is derived by neither Rule (seq) nor Rule (choice) nor Rule (loop)
nor Rule (infer). By induction, the claim holds for Γ0. So by Lemma B.64 the claim also holds
for Γ1. If the claim holds for Γ2, then the claim follow for Γ3 from Lemma B.64 again. So it
remains to show that the claim holds for Γ2 relying on Γ1. We do a case distinction over the
type rules applied for the derivation ⊢ { Γ1 } com { Γ2 }. To that end, let p ∈ PVar be some
arbitrary pointer variable and let r ∈ AVar be some arbitrary angel. Let mτ (p) = cp and let
cr ∈ reprτ (r). We show
(G1) reachO,t,cp (H(τ .act)) ⊆ Loc(Γ2(p))
(G2) reachO,t,cr (H(τ .act)) ⊆ Loc(Γ2(r))
(G3) isValid(Γ2(p)) =⇒ p ∈ validτ .act
(G4) L ∈ Γ2(p) =⇒ noaliasτ .act(p)
(G5) isValid(Γ2(r)) =⇒ cr < freed(τ .act)
Case Rule (begin).
By definition, we have Γ2 = Γ1, mτ = mτ .act , validτ = validτ .act , freed(τ ) = freed(τ .act),
reprτ = reprτ .act , andH(τ ) = H(τ .act). Hence, the claim follows by induction.
Case Rule (end).
By definition, we have Γ2 = rm(Γ1). By definition, Γ2(p) ⊆ Γ1(p) and Γ2(r) ⊆ Γ1(r). This
means we have Loc(Γ2(p)) ⊇ Loc(Γ1(p)) and Loc(Γ2(r)) ⊇ Loc(Γ1(r)). As in the previous case,
we have mτ = mτ .act , validτ = validτ .act , freed(τ ) = freed(τ .act), reprτ = reprτ .act , and
H(τ ) = H(τ .act). So the claim follows by induction.
Case Rule (assign1).
We have freed(τ ) = freed(τ .act) and inv(τ ) ≡ inv(τ .act). Hence, Property (G5) holds by
induction. If L ∈ Γ2(p), then p does not appear in com by definition of Rule (assign1). Hence,
no alias of p is created by com and Property (G4) continues to hold by induction. If isValid(Γ2)
then there are two cases. First, com ≡ p := q. Then, Γ2(p) = Γ1(q) \ {L}. Hence, q ∈ validτ
by induction. This leads to p ∈ validτ .act as desired. Second, p is not assigned to by com.
Then, Γ2(p) ⊆ Γ1(p). Hence, p ∈ validτ by induction and p ∈ validτ .act thus. This concludes
Property (G3). Note thatH(τ .act) = H(τ ). Property (G2) remains to hold by induction since r
is not affected by com. It remains to establish Property (G1). If p does not occur in com, nothing
needs to be show. So assume p occurs in com. In the first case, p occurs on the right-hand
side of the assignment in com. Then, Γ2(p) = Γ1(p) \ {L}. That is, Loc(Γ1(p)) ⊆ Loc(Γ2(p)).
Then, Property (G1) follows by induction. Otherwise, p appears on the left-hand side of
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the assignment in com. So com ≡ p := q for some q. Then, Γ2(p) = Γ1(q) \ {L}. More-
over, mτ .act(p) = mτ (q) = cp. By induction, we have reachO,t,cp (H(τ )) ⊆ Loc(Γ1(q)). Hence,
reachO,t,cp (H(τ )) ⊆ Loc(Γ1(q) \ {L}). We get the desired reachO,t,cp (H(τ .act)) ⊆ Loc(Γ2(q))
by definition.
Case Rule (assign2).
Analogous to the previous case for (assign1).
Case Rule (assign3).
Analogous to the previous case for (assign1).
Case Rule (assign4),(assign5),(assign6),(assume2).
We have Γ2 = Γ1, mτ = mτ .act , reprτ = reprτ .act , validτ = validτ .act , freed(τ ) = freed(τ .act),
andH(τ ) = H(τ .act). Hence, the claim follows by induction.
Case Rule (assume1).
We have freed(τ ) = freed(τ .act) and inv(τ ) ≡ inv(τ .act). Hence, Property (G5) holds by
induction. If L ∈ Γ2(p), then L ∈ Γ1(p) due to the type rule. This means noaliasτ (p). Note that
mτ = mτ .act . Moreover, since τ .act is PRF we know that the pointers in com are valid. Hence,
validτ = validτ .act . So we get noaliasτ .act(p) by definition. This establishes Property (G4).
If isValid(Γ2(p)), then there are two cases. First, isValid(Γ1(p)) holds. This means we have
p ∈ validτ by induction. As stated above, this results in p ∈ validτ .act . Second, ¬isValid(Γ1(p))
holds. Then, p is validated by com. For this to happen, p must appear in com. Since τ .act is
assumed to be PRF, we know p ∈ validτ must hold. So p ∈ validτ .act as before. This gives
Property (G3). Note that we have H(τ .act) = H(τ ) and reprτ = reprτ .act . So It remains to
establish Property (G2) continues to hold by induction since r is not affected. It remains to
establish Property (G1). If p does not occur in com nothing needs to be show. So assume p
appears in com. Wlog. com is of the form com ≡ assume p = q. Due to the type rule, we have
Γ2(p) = Γ1(p) \ {L}. By the semantics, we have cp = mτ .act(p) = mτ (p) = mτ (q) = mτ .act(q).
So by induction, reachO,t,cp (H(τ )) ⊆ Loc(Γ1(p))∩Loc(Γ1(p)) = Loc(Γ1(p) ∧ Γ2(p)) = Loc(Γ2(p)).
This concludes Property (G1).
Case Rule (eqal).
If isValid(Γ2(p)), then there are two cases. First, isValid(Γ1(p)) holds. This means we have
p ∈ validτ by induction. Then, p ∈ validτ .act because validτ = validτ .act by definition. Second,
¬isValid(Γ1(p)) holds. Then, p is validated by com. For this to happen, com must be of the
form com ≡ @inv p = q with isValid(q). By induction, we have q ∈ validτ . Then, Lemma B.61
gives p ∈ validτ . Hence, p ∈ validτ .act as before. This concludes Property (G3). The remaining
properties follow analogously to the previous case for (assume1). For Property (G1) note that
reprτ ⇐⇒ reprτ .act by definition together with the fact that inv(τ .act) holds.
Case Rule (active) for pointers.
If isValid(Γ2(p)), then there are two cases. First, isValid(Γ1(p)) holds. This means p ∈ validτ
by induction. Then, p ∈ validτ .act because validτ = validτ .act . Second, ¬isValid(Γ1(p)) holds.
Then, p is validated by com. So com must be of the form com ≡ @inv active(p). Since the
invariants hold by assumption, inv(τ .act), we can invoke Lemma B.62. It gives p ∈ validτ .act .
Altogether, this concludes Property (G3). If L ∈ Γ2(p), then L ∈ Γ1(p) due to the type rule.
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Hence, the induction hypothesis together with mτ = mτ .act and validτ = validτ .act gives
Property (G4). For Property (G5) note that Γ2(r) = Γ1(r) and that reprτ (r) = reprτ .act(r)
because inv(τ .act) by assumption. So Property (G5) follows by induction. Note that we
haveH(τ .act) = H(τ ). Since r is not affected, Property (G2) follows by induction. We show
Property (G1). If com does not contain p, nothing needs to be show. Otherwise, com is of the
form com ≡ @inv active(p). From Lemma B.62 we get reachO,t,cp (H(τ .act)) ⊆ Loc(A). From
induction, we get reachO,t,cp (H(τ .act)) ⊆ Loc(Γ1(p)). By definition, this establishes the desired
reachO,t,cp (H(τ .act)) ⊆ Loc(Γ1(p) ∧ A) = Loc(Γ2(p)) and thus concludes Property (G1).
Case Rule (active) for angels.
Using Lemma B.63, this case is analogous to the previous, pointer case.
Case Rule (malloc).
Recall that τ .act ∈ O⟦P⟧Adr . So act allocates a fresh address. Hence, freed(τ ) = freed(τ .act)
by definition. Moreover, inv(τ ) ≡ inv(τ .act). Then, Property (G5) holds by induction. Prop-
erty (G2) remains to hold by induction since r is not affected. Consider Property (G1). If p
does not appear in com, nothing needs to be shown. Otherwise, com ≡ p := malloc. From
Lemma B.38 we get cp < retired(τ ). By definition then, cp < retired(τ .act). Then, Lemma B.42
gives reachtcpH(τ .act) ∈ Loc(L). And by definition we have Γ2(p) = {L}. This concludes
Property (G1).
For the remaining properties, we do a case distinction on q. First, consider the case p , q. The,
Γ2(p) = Γ1(p) and p ∈ validτ .act ⇐⇒ p ∈ validτ . So Property (G3) follows by induction. Also
by induction, we have noaliasτ (p). Due to up, we have mτ .act(p) = mτ (p) , seg. Towards
a contradiction, assume , noaliasτ .act(p). By definition, there is some pointer expression
pexp ∈ validτ .act \ {p} with mτ .act(p) = mτ .act(pexp). Since mτ .act(q) ∈ fresh(τ ) we have
mτ .act(q) < range(mτ ) due to Lemma B.37. Hence, pexp , q. Moreover, pexp . mτ .act(q).next
because mτ .act(mτ .act(q).next) = seg. Consequently, pexp is not affected by act. This means
we have mτ .act(pexp) = mτ (pexp) and pexp ∈ validτ \ {p}. That is, , noaliasτ (p). Since this
contradicts induction, we conclude the desired noaliasτ .act(p). This establishes Property (G4).
Second, consider the case p = q. Then, Γ2(p) = {L}. By Lemmas B.33 and B.37 we have
a < mτ (validτ ). Hence, we get a < mτ .act(validτ .act \ {p}). This means noaliasτ .act(p) holds
by definition. This establishes Property (G4). And by definition p ∈ validτ .act . So Property (G3)
holds as well.
Case Rule (enter).
Note that we have mτ = mτ .act and reprτ = reprτ .act by definition. By induction, we have
reachO,t,cp (H(τ )) ⊆ Loc(Γ1(p)). Type inference gives postp,com(Loc(Γ1(p))) ⊆ Loc(Γ2(p)). Since
H(τ .act) ∈ S(O) due to the semantics, we get H(τ .act) ∈ postp,com(Loc(Γ1(p))). Hence,
postp,com(Loc(Γ2(p))) ⊆ Loc(Γ2(p)) as desired. This concludes Property (G1). Property (G2)
follows along the same lines. If isValid(Γ2(p)), then isValid(Γ1(p)) by the definition of type
inference. Moreover, validτ = validτ .act . Hence, Property (G3) follows by induction. Sim-
ilarly, isValid(Γ2(r)) implies isValid(Γ1(r)). So Property (G5) follows by induction together
with freed(τ ) = freed(τ .act) and inv(τ ) ≡ inv(τ .act). If L ∈ Γ2(p), then L ∈ Γ1(p) by defi-
nition. Note that mτ = mτ .act . Hence, noaliasτ .act(p) follows by induction. This establishes
Property (G4).
Case Rule (exit).
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Analogously to the previous case for (enter).
Case Rule (angel).
By definition, mτ = mτ .act , validτ = validτ .act , and freed(τ ) = freed(τ .act). Moreover, the
type rule gives Γ2(p) = Γ1(p). So Properties (G3) and (G4) follow by induction. If isValid(Γ2(r)),
then r does not appear in com. So by the type rule we have Γ2(r) = Γ1(r). Hence, Property (G5)
follows by induction. Since p is not affected, we get Property (G1) from induction. It remains
to consider Property (G2). If r does not appear in com, nothing needs to be show because
reprτ .act(r) = reprτ (r). Otherwise, we have Γ2(r) = . This concludes Property (G2).
Case Rule (member).
By definition, mτ = mτ .act , validτ = validτ .act , and freed(τ ) = freed(τ .act). If isValid(Γ2(r)),
then isValid(Γ1(r)) holds since Γ2(r) = Γ1(r). So Property (G5) follows by induction. If L ∈ Γ2(p),
then L ∈ Γ1(p) since angels cannot acquire guarantee L due to the type rules. Hence, Prop-
erty (G4) follows by induction. If isValid(Γ2(p)), then there are two cases. First, isValid(Γ1(p))
holds. Then, p ∈ validτ by induction and thus p ∈ validτ .act . Second, ¬isValid(Γ1(p)) holds.
Then, p is validated by com. For this to happen, we must have com ≡ @inv p in r ′ with
isValid(Γ1(r ′)). Since inv(τ .act) hold, we get mτ (p) ∈ reprτ .act(r ′). Moreover, isValid(Γ1(r ′))
gives isValid(Γ2(r ′)). So the already established Property (G5) yields mτ (p) < freed(τ .act).
Hence, mτ .act(p) < freed(τ .act). Now, p ∈ validτ .act by the contrapositive of Lemma B.40. This
establishes Property (G3). Consider now Property (G2). If r ′ does not appear in com, noth-
ing needs to be shown. Otherwise, com ≡ @inv q in r . Due to assumption of inv(τ .act),
we have mτ .act(q) ∈ reprτ .act(r). By definition, mτ .act(q) = mτ (q). Again by definition,
we get mτ (q) ∈ reprτ (r) because reprτ (r) is defined to be the maximal set. This means
reprτ (r) = reprτ .act(r). Hence, we can conclude Property (G2) by induction. It remains to
show Property (G1). If p does not occur in com, nothing needs to be shown. Otherwise,
com ≡ @inv p in r ′. Similarly to the above, we get cp ∈ reprτ (r ′). So we get by induction:
reachO,t,cp (H(τ )) ⊆ Loc(Γ1(p)) ∩ Loc(Γ1(r ′)) = Loc(Γ1(p) ∧ Γ1(r ′)) = Loc(Γ2(p)) .
This concludes Property (G1) by induction together withH(τ .act) = H(τ ).
The above case distinction is complete and shows that the claim holds for t and Γ2. Hence,
the claim holds for Γ3 as reasoned above.
Now, we show that freed(τ .act)∩ retired(τ .act) =  holds. We have freed(τ .act) ⊆ freed(τ ) by
the fact that act cannot be a free due to the fact that t ′ , ⊥. If retired(τ .act) ⊆ retired(τ ) holds,
then the claim follows by induction. Otherwise, we have retired(τ .act) = retired(τ )∪ {a} with
com ≡ enter retire(p) and mτ (p) = a. Since ⊢ { Γ1 } com { Γ2 } holds, we know p ∈ validτ . By
the contrapositive of Lemma B.33, a < freed(τ ). So by induction, freed(τ .act)∩retired(τ .act) =
.
Ad t , t ′ , ⊥. We have
⊢ { Γ[t ]init } flatt (τ ) { Γ4 } and flatt (τ .act) = flatt (τ ) and ⊢ { Γ[t ]init } flatt (τ .act) { Γ4 } .
The induction hypothesis applies to ⊢ { Γ[t ]init } flatt (τ ) { Γ4 }. We have to show that the desired
properties are stable under interference.
Consider some p ∈ dom(Γ4) ∩ PVar . If L ∈ Γ4(p), then p ∈ localt by the contrapositive of
Lemma B.59. By induction, we have noaliasτ (p). Then, Lemma B.60 gives noaliasτ .act(p). If
isValid(Γ4(p)), then p ∈ validτ by induction. We invoke Lemma B.60 and get p ∈ validτ .act .
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Consider some r ∈ dom(Γ4) ∩ AVar . If isValid(Γ4(r)), then r ∈ localt by the contrapositive of
Lemma B.59. By induction we get reprτ (r) ∩ freed(τ ) = . Due to r being local to a thread
other than the one executing act, r cannot occur in com. Consequently, reprτ .act(r) = reprτ (r).
So freed(τ .act) ⊆ freed(τ ) due to t ′ , ⊥ gives reprτ .act(r) ∩ freed(τ .act) =  as desired.
It remains to establish H(τ .act) ⊆ Loc(Γ4). If H(τ .act) = H(τ ), then the claim follows by
induction. So let H(τ .act) = h.evt with H(τ ) = h. We have evt ↓t= ϵ . By definition of
closedness under interference, we have for all a and i:
reachO,t,a(h) ⊆ Loc(S) =⇒ reachO,t,a(h.evt) ⊆ Loc(S)
and reachO,t,a(h) ⊆ Loc(Ei ) =⇒ reachO,t,a(h.evt) ⊆ Loc(Ei ) .
Consider some x ∈ dom(Γ4). By Lemma B.59 we know A < Γ4(p). If L ∈ Γ4(x), then we
have x ∈ PVar since the type rules do not allow angels to carry L. Moreover, induction
gives reachO,t,mτ (x)(h) ⊆ Loc(L). To the contrary, assume reachO,t,mτ (x)(h.evt) ⊈ Loc(L). By
definition, this means that evt makes OBase leave its initial location. Since h.evt ∈ S(O) due
to the semantics, we must have evt = enter retire(t ′, mτ (x)). That is, com ≡ enter retire(q)
with mτ (q) = mτ (x). Since τ .act is assumed to be PRF, we must have q ∈ validτ . This results in
¬noaliasτ (x) and resembles a contradiction. So we conclude reachO,t,mτ (x)(h.evt) ⊆ Loc(L). By
the contrapositive of Lemma B.59 we also know that x ∈ localt . So mτ (x) = mτ .act(x). That is,
reachO,t,mτ .act (x)(h.evt) ⊈ Loc(L). Moreover, if x ∈ AVar , then x ∈ localt byAssumption 2. This
means reprτ (x) = reprτ .act(x) since x does not appear in com. So we get reachO,t,a(h.evt) ⊆
Loc(Γ4(x)) for all a ∈ reprτ .act(x) by induction.
The remaining freed(τ .act) ∩ retired(τ .act) =  follows as in the previous case for t = t ′ , ⊥.
This concludes the case.
Ad t ′ = ⊥. We have act = (⊥, free(a),). Consider some thread t and type environment Γ
with ⊢ { Γ[t ]init } flatt (τ ) { Γ }. By definition, flatt (τ .act) = flatt (τ ). So ⊢ { Γ[t ]init } flatt (τ .act) { Γ }.
We show that Γ satisfies the claim. LetH(τ ) = h. Then,H(τ .act) = h.free(a). By the semantics,
we have h.free(a) ∈ S(O).
Consider some p ∈ dom(Γ) ∩ PVar . If L ∈ Γ(p), then noaliasτ (p). Since mτ = mτ .act and
validτ .act ⊆ validτ , we get noaliasτ .act(p). If isValid(Γ(p)), then {A,L,S} ∩ Γ(p) , . By
induction, we have p ∈ validτ . Note that we have reachO,t,mτ (p)(h) ⊆ Loc(Γ(p)) by induction.
Hence, a , mτ (p) must hold as for otherwise h.free(a) < S(O) by the definition of {A,L,S}.
So, we get p ∈ validτ .act by definition.
Consider some r ∈ dom(Γ) ∩ AVar . If isValid(Γ(r)), then reprτ (r) ∩ freed(τ ) =  by induction.
By definition, we have reprτ (r) = reprτ .act(r). Moreover, freed(τ .act) = freed(τ ) ∪ {a}. So
in order to arrive at reprτ .act(r) ∩ freed(τ .act) = , it suffices to establish a < reprτ (r). To
the contrary, assume a ∈ reprτ (r). Then, reachO,t,a(h) ⊆ Loc(Γ(r)) by induction. However,
similar to the pointer case above, this meansh.free(a) < S(O) because of isValid(Γ(r)). Hence,
a < reprτ (r) must hold as desired.
It remains to show that reachO,t,b (h.free(a)) ⊆ Loc(Γ(x)) for every x ∈ dom(Γ4) with a ,
mτ (x) for x ∈ PVar and a < reprτ (x) for x ∈ AVar . By definition we have:
reachO,t,b (h) ⊆ Loc(Ei ) =⇒ reachO,t,b (h.free(a)) ⊆ Loc(Ei )
reachO,t,b (h) ⊆ Loc(S) =⇒ reachO,t,b (h.free(a)) ⊆ Loc(S)
reachO,t,b (h) ⊆ Loc(A) =⇒ reachO,t,b (h.free(a)) ⊆ Loc(A) if a , b
reachO,t,b (h) ⊆ Loc(L) =⇒ reachO,t,b (h.free(a)) ⊆ Loc(L) if a , b
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Recall from above that {A,L} ∩ Γ(x) ,  implies a , mτ (x) for x ∈ PVar and a < reprτ (x)
for x ∈ AVar . Hence, we conclude the desired reachO,t,b (h.free(a)) ⊆ Loc(Γ(x)) by induction
together with mτ = mτ .act and reprτ = reprτ .act .
Lastly, we show freed(τ .act) ∩ retired(τ .act) = . We have freed(τ .act) = freed(τ ) ∪ {a} and
retired(τ .act) = retired(τ ) \ {a}. Then the claim follows by induction.
□
Proof of Lemma B.66. Let ⊢ { Γinit } P { ΓP } and inv(⟦P⟧). Towards a contradiction, assume the
claim does not hold. That is, there is a shortest computation τ .act ∈ O⟦P⟧Adr such that τ .act raises
a pointer race or ¬inv(τ .act). By minimality, τ is PRF and inv(τ ). Let act = (t , com, up). (Note that
com is neither beginAtomic nor endAtomic due to the assumption.) By Lemma B.58, there is Γ3 such
that ⊢ { Γ[t ]init } flatt (τ .act) { Γ3 }. We have flatt (τ .act) = flatt (τ ); com by definition. So by the type
rules there is Γ0, Γ1, Γ2
⊢ { Γ[t ]init } flatt (τ ) { Γ0 } Γ0 ; Γ1 ⊢ { Γ1 } com { Γ2 } Γ2 ; Γ3
First, consider the case where τ .act raises a pointer race. By definition of pointer races, act is on of:
an unsafe access, an unsafe assumption, an unsafe enter, or an unsafe retire.
• If act is an unsafe access, then com contains p.next or p.data with p < validτ . That is,
⊢ { Γ1 } com { Γ2 } is derived using on of the following rules: (assign2), (assign3), (assign5),
or (assign6). Since the derivation is defined, we must have Γ1(p) = T with isValid(T ). By
Lemma B.65, this means p ∈ validτ . Since this contradicts the assumption of act raising a
pointer race, this case cannot apply.
• If act is an unsafe assumption, then com ≡ assume p = q with {p, q} ⊈ validτ . That is,
⊢ { Γ1 } com { Γ2 } is derived using rule (assume1). By definition, we have Γ1(p) = T , Γ1(q) =
T ′ with isValid(T ) and isValid(T ′). From Lemma B.65 we get {p, q} ⊆ validτ . Since this
contradicts the assumption of act raising a pointer race, this case cannot apply.
• Consider an unsafe enter, i.e., com ≡ enter func(p¯, u¯). That is, ⊢ { Γ1 } com { Γ2 } is derived
using rule (enter). Let mτ (p¯) = a¯ and mτ (u¯) = d¯ . That act is an unsafe enter means that
there are b¯ and c with:
∀i . (ai = c ∨ pi ∈ validτ ) =⇒ ai = bi
and FO(h.func(t , b¯, d¯), c) ⊈ FO(h.func(t , a¯, d¯), c) .
Let p¯ = p1, . . . , pn with Γ(pi ) = Ti . From Lemma B.65 we get pi < validτ =⇒ ¬isValid(Ti ).
Hence, the following holds:
∀i . (ai = c ∨ pi ∈ validτ ) =⇒ ai = bi
implies ∀i . ai , bi =⇒ (ai , c ∧ pi < validτ )
implies ∀i . ai , bi =⇒ (ai , c ∧ ¬isValid(Ti ))
implies ∀i . (ai = c ∨ isValid(Ti )) =⇒ ai = bi
So safeEnter(Γ1, func(p¯, u¯)) = false. As this contradicts ⊢ { Γ1 } com { Γ2 }, this case cannot
apply.
• Consider an unsafe retire, i.e., com ≡ enter retire(p)with p < validτ . As in the previous case,
⊢ { Γ1 } com { Γ2 } is derived using rule (enter). It givesA ∈ Γ1(p). That is, isValid(Γ1(p)) = true.
Then, Lemma B.65 yields p ∈ validτ . Hence, this case cannot apply.
The above case distinction is complete. That is, τ .act cannot raise a pointer race. Hence, we must
have ¬inv(τ .act). Since we have inv(τ ) as stated before, act must be an annotation that does not
hold. By Lemma B.44 for τ .act there is σ ∈ ⟦P⟧ with ctrl(τ .act) = ctrl(σ ), mτ .act = mσ , and
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inv(σ ) =⇒ inv(τ .act). The contrapositive of the latter, gives ¬inv(τ .act) =⇒ ¬inv(σ ). That is, we
must have ¬inv(σ ). This contradicts the assumption of inv(⟦P⟧), concluding the claim thus. □
Proof of Lemma B.67. LetOSMR supports elision. Furthermore, let ⊢P and inv(⟦P⟧). By LemmaB.66
we know that O⟦P⟧Adr is PRF and that inv(O⟦P⟧Adr ) holds. Now, to the contrary, assume the over-
all claim does not hold. Then there is τ .act ∈ ⟦P⟧AdrAdr with a ∈ retired(τ ), act = (t , com, up),
com ≡ enter retire(p), and mτ (p) = a. Then, Lemma B.36 yields σ ∈ O⟦P⟧Adr such that τ ∼ σ
and retired(τ ) ⊆ retired(σ ). From the former we get σ .act ∈ O⟦P⟧Adr . Moreover, together with
O⟦P⟧Adr PRF and thus p ∈ validσ , we get mτ (p) = a = mσ (p). The latter gives a ∈ retired(σ ).
FromLemmaB.58we get some Γ3 with ⊢ { Γ[t ]init }flatt (σ .act){ Γ3 }. Then,flatt (σ .act) = flatt (σ ); com
by definition. So the typing rules give some Γ0, Γ1, Γ2 with
⊢ { Γ[t ]init } flatt (σ ) { Γ0 } Γ0 ; Γ1 ⊢ { Γ1 } com { Γ2 } Γ2 ; Γ3
where the derivation for ⊢ { Γ1 } com { Γ2 } is due to Rule (enter). By definition, this means we
have A ∈ Γ1(p). Note that σ is PRF and inv(σ ). Moreover, ⊢ { Γ[t ]init } flatt (σ ) { Γ1 } holds due to
Rule (infer). Now, Lemma B.65 yields reachO,t,a(H(σ )) ⊆ Loc(Γ1(p)). In particular, this means
reachO,t,a(H(σ )) ⊆ Loc(A). Hence, (L2,φ)−→h (L2,φ) with φ = {za 7→ a} and h = H(σ ). Then,
Lemma B.42 gives a < retired(σ ). This contradicts the previous a ∈ retired(σ ). □
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Follows from Lemmas B.66 and B.67. □
D TYPE CHECKING
Lemma D.1. AntiChainTypes := (Types/;∩;−1 ,;) is a complete lattice.
Proof. The least element is the most precise type containing every guarantee. The join of two
guarantees EL ⊔ EL′ is characterized by the union L ∪ L′, which is again closed under interference.
The meet of two guarantees EL ⊓ EL′ requires care. The intersection L ∩ L′ may not be closed
under interference, in which case a corresponding guarantee EL∩L′ does not exist. Instead, we take
the largest set of locations that is closed under interference and lives inside the intersection. It is
guaranteed to exist. □
Lemma D.2. sp(·, com) is monotonic.
Proof. The case that requires care is Rule (enter). A larger enriched environment has less
guarantees, and eventually safeEnter(Γ, func(p¯, u¯)) may fail. In this case, however, we return ⊤. □
Proof of Proposition 7.2. For lsol(X ) ⊒ intersectionsqtext ⊢{ Γinit } stmt { Γ } Γ, observe that the least solution to
the constraint system yields a type derivation ⊢ { Γinit } stmt { lsol(X ) }. Indeed, as the solution
assigns a type environment to every control point, it already gives the intermediary environments
we should assume for a Rule (seq). For the reverse direction, consider ⊢ { Γinit } stmt { Γ }. One can
show that by assigning the environments encountered in the type derivation to the variables of the
corresponding control points, we obtain a solution to the constraint system. Since lsol(X ) is the
least solution, lsol(X ) ⊑ Γ. As the reasoning holds for every derivation, lsol(X ) will lower bound
the meet of the environments. □
Lemma D.3. The Kleene iteration takes time O(n2) where n is the size of the input program.
Proof. We denote the set of program variables byVars and the set of variables from the constraint
system by CVars = {X1, . . . ,Xk }. The Kleene iteration solving the constraint system works over
the product lattice ((
AntiChainTypesVars ∪ {⊤}
)CVars
,⊑
)
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where ⊑ is the component-wise ⊑ from the original lattice Envs⊤. Following the discussion in
Section 7, chains in this lattice have a maximal length ofm which is quadratic in n. To compute the
Kleene iteration, we employ a worklist algorithm.
We introduce notations to ease the formal development. We use Vi = (V 1i , . . . ,V k1 ) where V ji
denotes the value of variable X j in step i . Moreover, we maintain a worklistWi the entries of which
are variable indices that need to be recomputed after step i . That is, j ∈Wi states that the value
Vj of X j is no longer up to date since the variables that X j depends on have received new values
previously. We writeW .W ′ and mean worklistW concatenated with worklistW ′. We define a total
function Dep : {1, . . . ,k} → 2{1, ...,k } that computes dependencies among the variables from CVars.
That is, Dep(j) yields the indices of variables that depend on X j . We use Dep(j) during the Kleene
iteration to query those variables that we need to compute a new value for after updating the
value of X j . For example, the constraint sp(X1, com) ⊑ X2 implies 2 ∈ Dep(1). Similarly, we define
Req : {1, . . . ,k} → 2{1, ...,k } that computes requirements. That is, Req(j) computes the indices of
variables that are required to compute X j . For example, the constraint sp(X1, com) ⊑ X2 implies
1 ∈ Req(2). Both Dep and Req can be tabulated (in quadratic time) prior to the Kleene iteration.
In the beginning V j0 = ⊥ andW0 is empty. In the first step, a new value V i1 ∈ Envs⊤ for all
Xi ∈ CVars is computed. This is linear in n. Next, we perform steps until the worklist is empty
again or we have performedm steps—in both cases we are guaranteed to have found a fixed point.
To perform a step i → i + 1, letWi be of the formWi = j .W taili . Then, we (i) compute a new value
V ji+1 for X j , and (ii) setWi+1 = W taili .Dep(j). Removing the first element from a list, looking up
Dep(j), and appending two list can be done in constant time. Hence, (ii) can be done in constant
time. It remains to consider (i). The updated value is:
V ji+1 =
⊔
l ∈Req(j)
дj,l (V li )
where дj,l (V ) = V or дj,l (V ) = sp(V , com) for some com, depending on the constraints collected
from the input program. Recall from Section 7 that дj,l can be computed in constant time. For
Req(j) to yield a set of constant size, we rely on a simple preprocessing of the input program: every
primitive command is wrapped inside skip commands, that is, command com is preprocessed to
(skip; com); skip. This way we introduce fresh variables into the constraint system such that no two
branches of the program share constraint system variables and that each nested statement does not
share constraint system variables with its parents. The program resulting from the preprocessing
is linear in the size of the original program, hence our reasoning so far remains valid for the
preprocessed program and carries over to the original one. Altogether, we arrive at (ii) taking
constant time. This concludes the claim. □
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